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rocksdb/db/write_batch.cc

2405 lines
88 KiB

// Copyright (c) 2011-present, Facebook, Inc. All rights reserved.
// This source code is licensed under both the GPLv2 (found in the
// COPYING file in the root directory) and Apache 2.0 License
// (found in the LICENSE.Apache file in the root directory).
//
// Copyright (c) 2011 The LevelDB Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file. See the AUTHORS file for names of contributors.
//
// WriteBatch::rep_ :=
// sequence: fixed64
// count: fixed32
// data: record[count]
// record :=
// kTypeValue varstring varstring
// kTypeDeletion varstring
Support for SingleDelete() Summary: This patch fixes #7460559. It introduces SingleDelete as a new database operation. This operation can be used to delete keys that were never overwritten (no put following another put of the same key). If an overwritten key is single deleted the behavior is undefined. Single deletion of a non-existent key has no effect but multiple consecutive single deletions are not allowed (see limitations). In contrast to the conventional Delete() operation, the deletion entry is removed along with the value when the two are lined up in a compaction. Note: The semantics are similar to @igor's prototype that allowed to have this behavior on the granularity of a column family ( https://reviews.facebook.net/D42093 ). This new patch, however, is more aggressive when it comes to removing tombstones: It removes the SingleDelete together with the value whenever there is no snapshot between them while the older patch only did this when the sequence number of the deletion was older than the earliest snapshot. Most of the complex additions are in the Compaction Iterator, all other changes should be relatively straightforward. The patch also includes basic support for single deletions in db_stress and db_bench. Limitations: - Not compatible with cuckoo hash tables - Single deletions cannot be used in combination with merges and normal deletions on the same key (other keys are not affected by this) - Consecutive single deletions are currently not allowed (and older version of this patch supported this so it could be resurrected if needed) Test Plan: make all check Reviewers: yhchiang, sdong, rven, anthony, yoshinorim, igor Reviewed By: igor Subscribers: maykov, dhruba, leveldb Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D43179
9 years ago
// kTypeSingleDeletion varstring
// kTypeRangeDeletion varstring varstring
Support for SingleDelete() Summary: This patch fixes #7460559. It introduces SingleDelete as a new database operation. This operation can be used to delete keys that were never overwritten (no put following another put of the same key). If an overwritten key is single deleted the behavior is undefined. Single deletion of a non-existent key has no effect but multiple consecutive single deletions are not allowed (see limitations). In contrast to the conventional Delete() operation, the deletion entry is removed along with the value when the two are lined up in a compaction. Note: The semantics are similar to @igor's prototype that allowed to have this behavior on the granularity of a column family ( https://reviews.facebook.net/D42093 ). This new patch, however, is more aggressive when it comes to removing tombstones: It removes the SingleDelete together with the value whenever there is no snapshot between them while the older patch only did this when the sequence number of the deletion was older than the earliest snapshot. Most of the complex additions are in the Compaction Iterator, all other changes should be relatively straightforward. The patch also includes basic support for single deletions in db_stress and db_bench. Limitations: - Not compatible with cuckoo hash tables - Single deletions cannot be used in combination with merges and normal deletions on the same key (other keys are not affected by this) - Consecutive single deletions are currently not allowed (and older version of this patch supported this so it could be resurrected if needed) Test Plan: make all check Reviewers: yhchiang, sdong, rven, anthony, yoshinorim, igor Reviewed By: igor Subscribers: maykov, dhruba, leveldb Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D43179
9 years ago
// kTypeMerge varstring varstring
// kTypeColumnFamilyValue varint32 varstring varstring
// kTypeColumnFamilyDeletion varint32 varstring
// kTypeColumnFamilySingleDeletion varint32 varstring
// kTypeColumnFamilyRangeDeletion varint32 varstring varstring
Support for SingleDelete() Summary: This patch fixes #7460559. It introduces SingleDelete as a new database operation. This operation can be used to delete keys that were never overwritten (no put following another put of the same key). If an overwritten key is single deleted the behavior is undefined. Single deletion of a non-existent key has no effect but multiple consecutive single deletions are not allowed (see limitations). In contrast to the conventional Delete() operation, the deletion entry is removed along with the value when the two are lined up in a compaction. Note: The semantics are similar to @igor's prototype that allowed to have this behavior on the granularity of a column family ( https://reviews.facebook.net/D42093 ). This new patch, however, is more aggressive when it comes to removing tombstones: It removes the SingleDelete together with the value whenever there is no snapshot between them while the older patch only did this when the sequence number of the deletion was older than the earliest snapshot. Most of the complex additions are in the Compaction Iterator, all other changes should be relatively straightforward. The patch also includes basic support for single deletions in db_stress and db_bench. Limitations: - Not compatible with cuckoo hash tables - Single deletions cannot be used in combination with merges and normal deletions on the same key (other keys are not affected by this) - Consecutive single deletions are currently not allowed (and older version of this patch supported this so it could be resurrected if needed) Test Plan: make all check Reviewers: yhchiang, sdong, rven, anthony, yoshinorim, igor Reviewed By: igor Subscribers: maykov, dhruba, leveldb Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D43179
9 years ago
// kTypeColumnFamilyMerge varint32 varstring varstring
// kTypeBeginPrepareXID varstring
// kTypeEndPrepareXID
// kTypeCommitXID varstring
// kTypeRollbackXID varstring
// kTypeBeginPersistedPrepareXID varstring
// kTypeBeginUnprepareXID varstring
// kTypeNoop
// varstring :=
// len: varint32
// data: uint8[len]
#include "rocksdb/write_batch.h"
#include <map>
#include <stack>
#include <stdexcept>
#include <type_traits>
#include <unordered_map>
support for concurrent adds to memtable Summary: This diff adds support for concurrent adds to the skiplist memtable implementations. Memory allocation is made thread-safe by the addition of a spinlock, with small per-core buffers to avoid contention. Concurrent memtable writes are made via an additional method and don't impose a performance overhead on the non-concurrent case, so parallelism can be selected on a per-batch basis. Write thread synchronization is an increasing bottleneck for higher levels of concurrency, so this diff adds --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield (default off). This feature causes threads joining a write batch group to spin for a short time (default 100 usec) using sched_yield, rather than going to sleep on a mutex. If the timing of the yield calls indicates that another thread has actually run during the yield then spinning is avoided. This option improves performance for concurrent situations even without parallel adds, although it has the potential to increase CPU usage (and the heuristic adaptation is not yet mature). Parallel writes are not currently compatible with inplace updates, update callbacks, or delete filtering. Enable it with --allow_concurrent_memtable_write (and --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield). Parallel memtable writes are performance neutral when there is no actual parallelism, and in my experiments (SSD server-class Linux and varying contention and key sizes for fillrandom) they are always a performance win when there is more than one thread. Statistics are updated earlier in the write path, dropping the number of DB mutex acquisitions from 2 to 1 for almost all cases. This diff was motivated and inspired by Yahoo's cLSM work. It is more conservative than cLSM: RocksDB's write batch group leader role is preserved (along with all of the existing flush and write throttling logic) and concurrent writers are blocked until all memtable insertions have completed and the sequence number has been advanced, to preserve linearizability. My test config is "db_bench -benchmarks=fillrandom -threads=$T -batch_size=1 -memtablerep=skip_list -value_size=100 --num=1000000/$T -level0_slowdown_writes_trigger=9999 -level0_stop_writes_trigger=9999 -disable_auto_compactions --max_write_buffer_number=8 -max_background_flushes=8 --disable_wal --write_buffer_size=160000000 --block_size=16384 --allow_concurrent_memtable_write" on a two-socket Xeon E5-2660 @ 2.2Ghz with lots of memory and an SSD hard drive. With 1 thread I get ~440Kops/sec. Peak performance for 1 socket (numactl -N1) is slightly more than 1Mops/sec, at 16 threads. Peak performance across both sockets happens at 30 threads, and is ~900Kops/sec, although with fewer threads there is less performance loss when the system has background work. Test Plan: 1. concurrent stress tests for InlineSkipList and DynamicBloom 2. make clean; make check 3. make clean; DISABLE_JEMALLOC=1 make valgrind_check; valgrind db_bench 4. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_TSAN=1 make all check; db_bench 5. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_ASAN=1 make all check; db_bench 6. make clean; OPT=-DROCKSDB_LITE make check 7. verify no perf regressions when disabled Reviewers: igor, sdong Reviewed By: sdong Subscribers: MarkCallaghan, IslamAbdelRahman, anthony, yhchiang, rven, sdong, guyg8, kradhakrishnan, dhruba Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D50589
9 years ago
#include <vector>
#include "db/column_family.h"
#include "db/db_impl/db_impl.h"
#include "db/dbformat.h"
support for concurrent adds to memtable Summary: This diff adds support for concurrent adds to the skiplist memtable implementations. Memory allocation is made thread-safe by the addition of a spinlock, with small per-core buffers to avoid contention. Concurrent memtable writes are made via an additional method and don't impose a performance overhead on the non-concurrent case, so parallelism can be selected on a per-batch basis. Write thread synchronization is an increasing bottleneck for higher levels of concurrency, so this diff adds --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield (default off). This feature causes threads joining a write batch group to spin for a short time (default 100 usec) using sched_yield, rather than going to sleep on a mutex. If the timing of the yield calls indicates that another thread has actually run during the yield then spinning is avoided. This option improves performance for concurrent situations even without parallel adds, although it has the potential to increase CPU usage (and the heuristic adaptation is not yet mature). Parallel writes are not currently compatible with inplace updates, update callbacks, or delete filtering. Enable it with --allow_concurrent_memtable_write (and --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield). Parallel memtable writes are performance neutral when there is no actual parallelism, and in my experiments (SSD server-class Linux and varying contention and key sizes for fillrandom) they are always a performance win when there is more than one thread. Statistics are updated earlier in the write path, dropping the number of DB mutex acquisitions from 2 to 1 for almost all cases. This diff was motivated and inspired by Yahoo's cLSM work. It is more conservative than cLSM: RocksDB's write batch group leader role is preserved (along with all of the existing flush and write throttling logic) and concurrent writers are blocked until all memtable insertions have completed and the sequence number has been advanced, to preserve linearizability. My test config is "db_bench -benchmarks=fillrandom -threads=$T -batch_size=1 -memtablerep=skip_list -value_size=100 --num=1000000/$T -level0_slowdown_writes_trigger=9999 -level0_stop_writes_trigger=9999 -disable_auto_compactions --max_write_buffer_number=8 -max_background_flushes=8 --disable_wal --write_buffer_size=160000000 --block_size=16384 --allow_concurrent_memtable_write" on a two-socket Xeon E5-2660 @ 2.2Ghz with lots of memory and an SSD hard drive. With 1 thread I get ~440Kops/sec. Peak performance for 1 socket (numactl -N1) is slightly more than 1Mops/sec, at 16 threads. Peak performance across both sockets happens at 30 threads, and is ~900Kops/sec, although with fewer threads there is less performance loss when the system has background work. Test Plan: 1. concurrent stress tests for InlineSkipList and DynamicBloom 2. make clean; make check 3. make clean; DISABLE_JEMALLOC=1 make valgrind_check; valgrind db_bench 4. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_TSAN=1 make all check; db_bench 5. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_ASAN=1 make all check; db_bench 6. make clean; OPT=-DROCKSDB_LITE make check 7. verify no perf regressions when disabled Reviewers: igor, sdong Reviewed By: sdong Subscribers: MarkCallaghan, IslamAbdelRahman, anthony, yhchiang, rven, sdong, guyg8, kradhakrishnan, dhruba Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D50589
9 years ago
#include "db/flush_scheduler.h"
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
#include "db/kv_checksum.h"
#include "db/memtable.h"
#include "db/merge_context.h"
#include "db/snapshot_impl.h"
Refactor trimming logic for immutable memtables (#5022) Summary: MyRocks currently sets `max_write_buffer_number_to_maintain` in order to maintain enough history for transaction conflict checking. The effectiveness of this approach depends on the size of memtables. When memtables are small, it may not keep enough history; when memtables are large, this may consume too much memory. We are proposing a new way to configure memtable list history: by limiting the memory usage of immutable memtables. The new option is `max_write_buffer_size_to_maintain` and it will take precedence over the old `max_write_buffer_number_to_maintain` if they are both set to non-zero values. The new option accounts for the total memory usage of flushed immutable memtables and mutable memtable. When the total usage exceeds the limit, RocksDB may start dropping immutable memtables (which is also called trimming history), starting from the oldest one. The semantics of the old option actually works both as an upper bound and lower bound. History trimming will start if number of immutable memtables exceeds the limit, but it will never go below (limit-1) due to history trimming. In order the mimic the behavior with the new option, history trimming will stop if dropping the next immutable memtable causes the total memory usage go below the size limit. For example, assuming the size limit is set to 64MB, and there are 3 immutable memtables with sizes of 20, 30, 30. Although the total memory usage is 80MB > 64MB, dropping the oldest memtable will reduce the memory usage to 60MB < 64MB, so in this case no memtable will be dropped. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5022 Differential Revision: D14394062 Pulled By: miasantreble fbshipit-source-id: 60457a509c6af89d0993f988c9b5c2aa9e45f5c5
5 years ago
#include "db/trim_history_scheduler.h"
#include "db/write_batch_internal.h"
#include "monitoring/perf_context_imp.h"
#include "monitoring/statistics.h"
#include "port/lang.h"
#include "rocksdb/merge_operator.h"
#include "rocksdb/system_clock.h"
refactor SavePoints (#5192) Summary: Savepoints are assumed to be used in a stack-wise fashion (only the top element should be used), so they were stored by `WriteBatch` in a member variable `save_points` using an std::stack. Conceptually this is fine, but the implementation had a few issues: - the `save_points_` instance variable was a plain pointer to a heap- allocated `SavePoints` struct. The destructor of `WriteBatch` simply deletes this pointer. However, the copy constructor of WriteBatch just copied that pointer, meaning that copying a WriteBatch with active savepoints will very likely have crashed before. Now a proper copy of the savepoints is made in the copy constructor, and not just a copy of the pointer - `save_points_` was an std::stack, which defaults to `std::deque` for the underlying container. A deque is a bit over the top here, as we only need access to the most recent savepoint (i.e. stack.top()) but never any elements at the front. std::deque is rather expensive to initialize in common environments. For example, the STL implementation shipped with GNU g++ will perform a heap allocation of more than 500 bytes to create an empty deque object. Although the `save_points_` container is created lazily by RocksDB, moving from a deque to a plain `std::vector` is much more memory-efficient. So `save_points_` is now a vector. - `save_points_` was changed from a plain pointer to an `std::unique_ptr`, making ownership more explicit. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5192 Differential Revision: D15024074 Pulled By: maysamyabandeh fbshipit-source-id: 5b128786d3789cde94e46465c9e91badd07a25d7
6 years ago
#include "util/autovector.h"
#include "util/cast_util.h"
#include "util/coding.h"
#include "util/duplicate_detector.h"
#include "util/string_util.h"
namespace ROCKSDB_NAMESPACE {
// anon namespace for file-local types
namespace {
enum ContentFlags : uint32_t {
DEFERRED = 1 << 0,
HAS_PUT = 1 << 1,
HAS_DELETE = 1 << 2,
HAS_SINGLE_DELETE = 1 << 3,
HAS_MERGE = 1 << 4,
HAS_BEGIN_PREPARE = 1 << 5,
HAS_END_PREPARE = 1 << 6,
HAS_COMMIT = 1 << 7,
HAS_ROLLBACK = 1 << 8,
HAS_DELETE_RANGE = 1 << 9,
HAS_BLOB_INDEX = 1 << 10,
HAS_BEGIN_UNPREPARE = 1 << 11,
};
struct BatchContentClassifier : public WriteBatch::Handler {
uint32_t content_flags = 0;
Status PutCF(uint32_t, const Slice&, const Slice&) override {
content_flags |= ContentFlags::HAS_PUT;
return Status::OK();
}
Status DeleteCF(uint32_t, const Slice&) override {
content_flags |= ContentFlags::HAS_DELETE;
return Status::OK();
}
Status SingleDeleteCF(uint32_t, const Slice&) override {
content_flags |= ContentFlags::HAS_SINGLE_DELETE;
return Status::OK();
}
Status DeleteRangeCF(uint32_t, const Slice&, const Slice&) override {
content_flags |= ContentFlags::HAS_DELETE_RANGE;
return Status::OK();
}
Status MergeCF(uint32_t, const Slice&, const Slice&) override {
content_flags |= ContentFlags::HAS_MERGE;
return Status::OK();
}
Status PutBlobIndexCF(uint32_t, const Slice&, const Slice&) override {
content_flags |= ContentFlags::HAS_BLOB_INDEX;
return Status::OK();
}
Status MarkBeginPrepare(bool unprepare) override {
content_flags |= ContentFlags::HAS_BEGIN_PREPARE;
if (unprepare) {
content_flags |= ContentFlags::HAS_BEGIN_UNPREPARE;
}
return Status::OK();
}
Status MarkEndPrepare(const Slice&) override {
content_flags |= ContentFlags::HAS_END_PREPARE;
return Status::OK();
}
Status MarkCommit(const Slice&) override {
content_flags |= ContentFlags::HAS_COMMIT;
return Status::OK();
}
Status MarkRollback(const Slice&) override {
content_flags |= ContentFlags::HAS_ROLLBACK;
return Status::OK();
}
};
Avoid user key copying for Get/Put/Write with user-timestamp (#5502) Summary: In previous https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/issues/5079, we added user-specified timestamp to `DB::Get()` and `DB::Put()`. Limitation is that these two functions may cause extra memory allocation and key copy. The reason is that `WriteBatch` does not allocate extra memory for timestamps because it is not aware of timestamp size, and we did not provide an API to assign/update timestamp of each key within a `WriteBatch`. We address these issues in this PR by doing the following. 1. Add a `timestamp_size_` to `WriteBatch` so that `WriteBatch` can take timestamps into account when calling `WriteBatch::Put`, `WriteBatch::Delete`, etc. 2. Add APIs `WriteBatch::AssignTimestamp` and `WriteBatch::AssignTimestamps` so that application can assign/update timestamps for each key in a `WriteBatch`. 3. Avoid key copy in `GetImpl` by adding new constructor to `LookupKey`. Test plan (on devserver): ``` $make clean && COMPILE_WITH_ASAN=1 make -j32 all $./db_basic_test --gtest_filter=Timestamp/DBBasicTestWithTimestampWithParam.PutAndGet/* $make check ``` If the API extension looks good, I will add more unit tests. Some simple benchmark using db_bench. ``` $rm -rf /dev/shm/dbbench/* && TEST_TMPDIR=/dev/shm ./db_bench -benchmarks=fillseq,readrandom -num=1000000 $rm -rf /dev/shm/dbbench/* && TEST_TMPDIR=/dev/shm ./db_bench -benchmarks=fillrandom -num=1000000 -disable_wal=true ``` Master is at a78503bd6c80a3c4137df1962a972fe406b4d90b. ``` | | readrandom | fillrandom | | master | 15.53 MB/s | 25.97 MB/s | | PR5502 | 16.70 MB/s | 25.80 MB/s | ``` Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5502 Differential Revision: D16340894 Pulled By: riversand963 fbshipit-source-id: 51132cf792be07d1efc3ac33f5768c4ee2608bb8
5 years ago
class TimestampAssigner : public WriteBatch::Handler {
public:
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
explicit TimestampAssigner(const Slice& ts,
WriteBatch::ProtectionInfo* prot_info)
: timestamp_(ts),
timestamps_(kEmptyTimestampList),
prot_info_(prot_info) {}
explicit TimestampAssigner(const std::vector<Slice>& ts_list,
WriteBatch::ProtectionInfo* prot_info)
: timestamps_(ts_list), prot_info_(prot_info) {}
Avoid user key copying for Get/Put/Write with user-timestamp (#5502) Summary: In previous https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/issues/5079, we added user-specified timestamp to `DB::Get()` and `DB::Put()`. Limitation is that these two functions may cause extra memory allocation and key copy. The reason is that `WriteBatch` does not allocate extra memory for timestamps because it is not aware of timestamp size, and we did not provide an API to assign/update timestamp of each key within a `WriteBatch`. We address these issues in this PR by doing the following. 1. Add a `timestamp_size_` to `WriteBatch` so that `WriteBatch` can take timestamps into account when calling `WriteBatch::Put`, `WriteBatch::Delete`, etc. 2. Add APIs `WriteBatch::AssignTimestamp` and `WriteBatch::AssignTimestamps` so that application can assign/update timestamps for each key in a `WriteBatch`. 3. Avoid key copy in `GetImpl` by adding new constructor to `LookupKey`. Test plan (on devserver): ``` $make clean && COMPILE_WITH_ASAN=1 make -j32 all $./db_basic_test --gtest_filter=Timestamp/DBBasicTestWithTimestampWithParam.PutAndGet/* $make check ``` If the API extension looks good, I will add more unit tests. Some simple benchmark using db_bench. ``` $rm -rf /dev/shm/dbbench/* && TEST_TMPDIR=/dev/shm ./db_bench -benchmarks=fillseq,readrandom -num=1000000 $rm -rf /dev/shm/dbbench/* && TEST_TMPDIR=/dev/shm ./db_bench -benchmarks=fillrandom -num=1000000 -disable_wal=true ``` Master is at a78503bd6c80a3c4137df1962a972fe406b4d90b. ``` | | readrandom | fillrandom | | master | 15.53 MB/s | 25.97 MB/s | | PR5502 | 16.70 MB/s | 25.80 MB/s | ``` Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5502 Differential Revision: D16340894 Pulled By: riversand963 fbshipit-source-id: 51132cf792be07d1efc3ac33f5768c4ee2608bb8
5 years ago
~TimestampAssigner() override {}
Status PutCF(uint32_t, const Slice& key, const Slice&) override {
AssignTimestamp(key);
++idx_;
return Status::OK();
}
Status DeleteCF(uint32_t, const Slice& key) override {
AssignTimestamp(key);
++idx_;
return Status::OK();
}
Status SingleDeleteCF(uint32_t, const Slice& key) override {
AssignTimestamp(key);
++idx_;
return Status::OK();
}
Status DeleteRangeCF(uint32_t, const Slice& begin_key,
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
const Slice& /* end_key */) override {
Avoid user key copying for Get/Put/Write with user-timestamp (#5502) Summary: In previous https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/issues/5079, we added user-specified timestamp to `DB::Get()` and `DB::Put()`. Limitation is that these two functions may cause extra memory allocation and key copy. The reason is that `WriteBatch` does not allocate extra memory for timestamps because it is not aware of timestamp size, and we did not provide an API to assign/update timestamp of each key within a `WriteBatch`. We address these issues in this PR by doing the following. 1. Add a `timestamp_size_` to `WriteBatch` so that `WriteBatch` can take timestamps into account when calling `WriteBatch::Put`, `WriteBatch::Delete`, etc. 2. Add APIs `WriteBatch::AssignTimestamp` and `WriteBatch::AssignTimestamps` so that application can assign/update timestamps for each key in a `WriteBatch`. 3. Avoid key copy in `GetImpl` by adding new constructor to `LookupKey`. Test plan (on devserver): ``` $make clean && COMPILE_WITH_ASAN=1 make -j32 all $./db_basic_test --gtest_filter=Timestamp/DBBasicTestWithTimestampWithParam.PutAndGet/* $make check ``` If the API extension looks good, I will add more unit tests. Some simple benchmark using db_bench. ``` $rm -rf /dev/shm/dbbench/* && TEST_TMPDIR=/dev/shm ./db_bench -benchmarks=fillseq,readrandom -num=1000000 $rm -rf /dev/shm/dbbench/* && TEST_TMPDIR=/dev/shm ./db_bench -benchmarks=fillrandom -num=1000000 -disable_wal=true ``` Master is at a78503bd6c80a3c4137df1962a972fe406b4d90b. ``` | | readrandom | fillrandom | | master | 15.53 MB/s | 25.97 MB/s | | PR5502 | 16.70 MB/s | 25.80 MB/s | ``` Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5502 Differential Revision: D16340894 Pulled By: riversand963 fbshipit-source-id: 51132cf792be07d1efc3ac33f5768c4ee2608bb8
5 years ago
AssignTimestamp(begin_key);
++idx_;
return Status::OK();
}
Status MergeCF(uint32_t, const Slice& key, const Slice&) override {
AssignTimestamp(key);
++idx_;
return Status::OK();
}
Status PutBlobIndexCF(uint32_t, const Slice&, const Slice&) override {
// TODO (yanqin): support blob db in the future.
return Status::OK();
}
Status MarkBeginPrepare(bool) override {
// TODO (yanqin): support in the future.
return Status::OK();
}
Status MarkEndPrepare(const Slice&) override {
// TODO (yanqin): support in the future.
return Status::OK();
}
Status MarkCommit(const Slice&) override {
// TODO (yanqin): support in the future.
return Status::OK();
}
Status MarkRollback(const Slice&) override {
// TODO (yanqin): support in the future.
return Status::OK();
}
private:
void AssignTimestamp(const Slice& key) {
assert(timestamps_.empty() || idx_ < timestamps_.size());
const Slice& ts = timestamps_.empty() ? timestamp_ : timestamps_[idx_];
size_t ts_sz = ts.size();
if (ts_sz == 0) {
// This key does not have timestamp, so skip.
return;
}
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
if (prot_info_ != nullptr) {
SliceParts old_key(&key, 1);
Slice key_no_ts(key.data(), key.size() - ts_sz);
std::array<Slice, 2> new_key_cmpts{{key_no_ts, ts}};
SliceParts new_key(new_key_cmpts.data(), 2);
prot_info_->entries_[idx_].UpdateK(old_key, new_key);
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
}
char* ptr = const_cast<char*>(key.data() + key.size() - ts_sz);
Avoid user key copying for Get/Put/Write with user-timestamp (#5502) Summary: In previous https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/issues/5079, we added user-specified timestamp to `DB::Get()` and `DB::Put()`. Limitation is that these two functions may cause extra memory allocation and key copy. The reason is that `WriteBatch` does not allocate extra memory for timestamps because it is not aware of timestamp size, and we did not provide an API to assign/update timestamp of each key within a `WriteBatch`. We address these issues in this PR by doing the following. 1. Add a `timestamp_size_` to `WriteBatch` so that `WriteBatch` can take timestamps into account when calling `WriteBatch::Put`, `WriteBatch::Delete`, etc. 2. Add APIs `WriteBatch::AssignTimestamp` and `WriteBatch::AssignTimestamps` so that application can assign/update timestamps for each key in a `WriteBatch`. 3. Avoid key copy in `GetImpl` by adding new constructor to `LookupKey`. Test plan (on devserver): ``` $make clean && COMPILE_WITH_ASAN=1 make -j32 all $./db_basic_test --gtest_filter=Timestamp/DBBasicTestWithTimestampWithParam.PutAndGet/* $make check ``` If the API extension looks good, I will add more unit tests. Some simple benchmark using db_bench. ``` $rm -rf /dev/shm/dbbench/* && TEST_TMPDIR=/dev/shm ./db_bench -benchmarks=fillseq,readrandom -num=1000000 $rm -rf /dev/shm/dbbench/* && TEST_TMPDIR=/dev/shm ./db_bench -benchmarks=fillrandom -num=1000000 -disable_wal=true ``` Master is at a78503bd6c80a3c4137df1962a972fe406b4d90b. ``` | | readrandom | fillrandom | | master | 15.53 MB/s | 25.97 MB/s | | PR5502 | 16.70 MB/s | 25.80 MB/s | ``` Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5502 Differential Revision: D16340894 Pulled By: riversand963 fbshipit-source-id: 51132cf792be07d1efc3ac33f5768c4ee2608bb8
5 years ago
memcpy(ptr, ts.data(), ts_sz);
}
static const std::vector<Slice> kEmptyTimestampList;
const Slice timestamp_;
const std::vector<Slice>& timestamps_;
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
WriteBatch::ProtectionInfo* const prot_info_;
Avoid user key copying for Get/Put/Write with user-timestamp (#5502) Summary: In previous https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/issues/5079, we added user-specified timestamp to `DB::Get()` and `DB::Put()`. Limitation is that these two functions may cause extra memory allocation and key copy. The reason is that `WriteBatch` does not allocate extra memory for timestamps because it is not aware of timestamp size, and we did not provide an API to assign/update timestamp of each key within a `WriteBatch`. We address these issues in this PR by doing the following. 1. Add a `timestamp_size_` to `WriteBatch` so that `WriteBatch` can take timestamps into account when calling `WriteBatch::Put`, `WriteBatch::Delete`, etc. 2. Add APIs `WriteBatch::AssignTimestamp` and `WriteBatch::AssignTimestamps` so that application can assign/update timestamps for each key in a `WriteBatch`. 3. Avoid key copy in `GetImpl` by adding new constructor to `LookupKey`. Test plan (on devserver): ``` $make clean && COMPILE_WITH_ASAN=1 make -j32 all $./db_basic_test --gtest_filter=Timestamp/DBBasicTestWithTimestampWithParam.PutAndGet/* $make check ``` If the API extension looks good, I will add more unit tests. Some simple benchmark using db_bench. ``` $rm -rf /dev/shm/dbbench/* && TEST_TMPDIR=/dev/shm ./db_bench -benchmarks=fillseq,readrandom -num=1000000 $rm -rf /dev/shm/dbbench/* && TEST_TMPDIR=/dev/shm ./db_bench -benchmarks=fillrandom -num=1000000 -disable_wal=true ``` Master is at a78503bd6c80a3c4137df1962a972fe406b4d90b. ``` | | readrandom | fillrandom | | master | 15.53 MB/s | 25.97 MB/s | | PR5502 | 16.70 MB/s | 25.80 MB/s | ``` Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5502 Differential Revision: D16340894 Pulled By: riversand963 fbshipit-source-id: 51132cf792be07d1efc3ac33f5768c4ee2608bb8
5 years ago
size_t idx_ = 0;
// No copy or move.
TimestampAssigner(const TimestampAssigner&) = delete;
TimestampAssigner(TimestampAssigner&&) = delete;
TimestampAssigner& operator=(const TimestampAssigner&) = delete;
TimestampAssigner&& operator=(TimestampAssigner&&) = delete;
};
const std::vector<Slice> TimestampAssigner::kEmptyTimestampList;
} // anon namespace
struct SavePoints {
refactor SavePoints (#5192) Summary: Savepoints are assumed to be used in a stack-wise fashion (only the top element should be used), so they were stored by `WriteBatch` in a member variable `save_points` using an std::stack. Conceptually this is fine, but the implementation had a few issues: - the `save_points_` instance variable was a plain pointer to a heap- allocated `SavePoints` struct. The destructor of `WriteBatch` simply deletes this pointer. However, the copy constructor of WriteBatch just copied that pointer, meaning that copying a WriteBatch with active savepoints will very likely have crashed before. Now a proper copy of the savepoints is made in the copy constructor, and not just a copy of the pointer - `save_points_` was an std::stack, which defaults to `std::deque` for the underlying container. A deque is a bit over the top here, as we only need access to the most recent savepoint (i.e. stack.top()) but never any elements at the front. std::deque is rather expensive to initialize in common environments. For example, the STL implementation shipped with GNU g++ will perform a heap allocation of more than 500 bytes to create an empty deque object. Although the `save_points_` container is created lazily by RocksDB, moving from a deque to a plain `std::vector` is much more memory-efficient. So `save_points_` is now a vector. - `save_points_` was changed from a plain pointer to an `std::unique_ptr`, making ownership more explicit. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5192 Differential Revision: D15024074 Pulled By: maysamyabandeh fbshipit-source-id: 5b128786d3789cde94e46465c9e91badd07a25d7
6 years ago
std::stack<SavePoint, autovector<SavePoint>> stack;
};
WriteBatch::WriteBatch(size_t reserved_bytes, size_t max_bytes)
: content_flags_(0), max_bytes_(max_bytes), rep_() {
Avoid user key copying for Get/Put/Write with user-timestamp (#5502) Summary: In previous https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/issues/5079, we added user-specified timestamp to `DB::Get()` and `DB::Put()`. Limitation is that these two functions may cause extra memory allocation and key copy. The reason is that `WriteBatch` does not allocate extra memory for timestamps because it is not aware of timestamp size, and we did not provide an API to assign/update timestamp of each key within a `WriteBatch`. We address these issues in this PR by doing the following. 1. Add a `timestamp_size_` to `WriteBatch` so that `WriteBatch` can take timestamps into account when calling `WriteBatch::Put`, `WriteBatch::Delete`, etc. 2. Add APIs `WriteBatch::AssignTimestamp` and `WriteBatch::AssignTimestamps` so that application can assign/update timestamps for each key in a `WriteBatch`. 3. Avoid key copy in `GetImpl` by adding new constructor to `LookupKey`. Test plan (on devserver): ``` $make clean && COMPILE_WITH_ASAN=1 make -j32 all $./db_basic_test --gtest_filter=Timestamp/DBBasicTestWithTimestampWithParam.PutAndGet/* $make check ``` If the API extension looks good, I will add more unit tests. Some simple benchmark using db_bench. ``` $rm -rf /dev/shm/dbbench/* && TEST_TMPDIR=/dev/shm ./db_bench -benchmarks=fillseq,readrandom -num=1000000 $rm -rf /dev/shm/dbbench/* && TEST_TMPDIR=/dev/shm ./db_bench -benchmarks=fillrandom -num=1000000 -disable_wal=true ``` Master is at a78503bd6c80a3c4137df1962a972fe406b4d90b. ``` | | readrandom | fillrandom | | master | 15.53 MB/s | 25.97 MB/s | | PR5502 | 16.70 MB/s | 25.80 MB/s | ``` Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5502 Differential Revision: D16340894 Pulled By: riversand963 fbshipit-source-id: 51132cf792be07d1efc3ac33f5768c4ee2608bb8
5 years ago
rep_.reserve((reserved_bytes > WriteBatchInternal::kHeader)
? reserved_bytes
: WriteBatchInternal::kHeader);
rep_.resize(WriteBatchInternal::kHeader);
}
WriteBatch::WriteBatch(size_t reserved_bytes, size_t max_bytes,
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
size_t protection_bytes_per_key)
: content_flags_(0), max_bytes_(max_bytes), rep_() {
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
// Currently `protection_bytes_per_key` can only be enabled at 8 bytes per
// entry.
assert(protection_bytes_per_key == 0 || protection_bytes_per_key == 8);
if (protection_bytes_per_key != 0) {
prot_info_.reset(new WriteBatch::ProtectionInfo());
}
rep_.reserve((reserved_bytes > WriteBatchInternal::kHeader)
? reserved_bytes
: WriteBatchInternal::kHeader);
rep_.resize(WriteBatchInternal::kHeader);
}
WriteBatch::WriteBatch(const std::string& rep)
: content_flags_(ContentFlags::DEFERRED), max_bytes_(0), rep_(rep) {}
WriteBatch::WriteBatch(std::string&& rep)
refactor SavePoints (#5192) Summary: Savepoints are assumed to be used in a stack-wise fashion (only the top element should be used), so they were stored by `WriteBatch` in a member variable `save_points` using an std::stack. Conceptually this is fine, but the implementation had a few issues: - the `save_points_` instance variable was a plain pointer to a heap- allocated `SavePoints` struct. The destructor of `WriteBatch` simply deletes this pointer. However, the copy constructor of WriteBatch just copied that pointer, meaning that copying a WriteBatch with active savepoints will very likely have crashed before. Now a proper copy of the savepoints is made in the copy constructor, and not just a copy of the pointer - `save_points_` was an std::stack, which defaults to `std::deque` for the underlying container. A deque is a bit over the top here, as we only need access to the most recent savepoint (i.e. stack.top()) but never any elements at the front. std::deque is rather expensive to initialize in common environments. For example, the STL implementation shipped with GNU g++ will perform a heap allocation of more than 500 bytes to create an empty deque object. Although the `save_points_` container is created lazily by RocksDB, moving from a deque to a plain `std::vector` is much more memory-efficient. So `save_points_` is now a vector. - `save_points_` was changed from a plain pointer to an `std::unique_ptr`, making ownership more explicit. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5192 Differential Revision: D15024074 Pulled By: maysamyabandeh fbshipit-source-id: 5b128786d3789cde94e46465c9e91badd07a25d7
6 years ago
: content_flags_(ContentFlags::DEFERRED),
max_bytes_(0),
rep_(std::move(rep)) {}
WriteBatch::WriteBatch(const WriteBatch& src)
refactor SavePoints (#5192) Summary: Savepoints are assumed to be used in a stack-wise fashion (only the top element should be used), so they were stored by `WriteBatch` in a member variable `save_points` using an std::stack. Conceptually this is fine, but the implementation had a few issues: - the `save_points_` instance variable was a plain pointer to a heap- allocated `SavePoints` struct. The destructor of `WriteBatch` simply deletes this pointer. However, the copy constructor of WriteBatch just copied that pointer, meaning that copying a WriteBatch with active savepoints will very likely have crashed before. Now a proper copy of the savepoints is made in the copy constructor, and not just a copy of the pointer - `save_points_` was an std::stack, which defaults to `std::deque` for the underlying container. A deque is a bit over the top here, as we only need access to the most recent savepoint (i.e. stack.top()) but never any elements at the front. std::deque is rather expensive to initialize in common environments. For example, the STL implementation shipped with GNU g++ will perform a heap allocation of more than 500 bytes to create an empty deque object. Although the `save_points_` container is created lazily by RocksDB, moving from a deque to a plain `std::vector` is much more memory-efficient. So `save_points_` is now a vector. - `save_points_` was changed from a plain pointer to an `std::unique_ptr`, making ownership more explicit. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5192 Differential Revision: D15024074 Pulled By: maysamyabandeh fbshipit-source-id: 5b128786d3789cde94e46465c9e91badd07a25d7
6 years ago
: wal_term_point_(src.wal_term_point_),
content_flags_(src.content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed)),
max_bytes_(src.max_bytes_),
rep_(src.rep_) {
refactor SavePoints (#5192) Summary: Savepoints are assumed to be used in a stack-wise fashion (only the top element should be used), so they were stored by `WriteBatch` in a member variable `save_points` using an std::stack. Conceptually this is fine, but the implementation had a few issues: - the `save_points_` instance variable was a plain pointer to a heap- allocated `SavePoints` struct. The destructor of `WriteBatch` simply deletes this pointer. However, the copy constructor of WriteBatch just copied that pointer, meaning that copying a WriteBatch with active savepoints will very likely have crashed before. Now a proper copy of the savepoints is made in the copy constructor, and not just a copy of the pointer - `save_points_` was an std::stack, which defaults to `std::deque` for the underlying container. A deque is a bit over the top here, as we only need access to the most recent savepoint (i.e. stack.top()) but never any elements at the front. std::deque is rather expensive to initialize in common environments. For example, the STL implementation shipped with GNU g++ will perform a heap allocation of more than 500 bytes to create an empty deque object. Although the `save_points_` container is created lazily by RocksDB, moving from a deque to a plain `std::vector` is much more memory-efficient. So `save_points_` is now a vector. - `save_points_` was changed from a plain pointer to an `std::unique_ptr`, making ownership more explicit. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5192 Differential Revision: D15024074 Pulled By: maysamyabandeh fbshipit-source-id: 5b128786d3789cde94e46465c9e91badd07a25d7
6 years ago
if (src.save_points_ != nullptr) {
save_points_.reset(new SavePoints());
save_points_->stack = src.save_points_->stack;
}
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
if (src.prot_info_ != nullptr) {
prot_info_.reset(new WriteBatch::ProtectionInfo());
prot_info_->entries_ = src.prot_info_->entries_;
}
refactor SavePoints (#5192) Summary: Savepoints are assumed to be used in a stack-wise fashion (only the top element should be used), so they were stored by `WriteBatch` in a member variable `save_points` using an std::stack. Conceptually this is fine, but the implementation had a few issues: - the `save_points_` instance variable was a plain pointer to a heap- allocated `SavePoints` struct. The destructor of `WriteBatch` simply deletes this pointer. However, the copy constructor of WriteBatch just copied that pointer, meaning that copying a WriteBatch with active savepoints will very likely have crashed before. Now a proper copy of the savepoints is made in the copy constructor, and not just a copy of the pointer - `save_points_` was an std::stack, which defaults to `std::deque` for the underlying container. A deque is a bit over the top here, as we only need access to the most recent savepoint (i.e. stack.top()) but never any elements at the front. std::deque is rather expensive to initialize in common environments. For example, the STL implementation shipped with GNU g++ will perform a heap allocation of more than 500 bytes to create an empty deque object. Although the `save_points_` container is created lazily by RocksDB, moving from a deque to a plain `std::vector` is much more memory-efficient. So `save_points_` is now a vector. - `save_points_` was changed from a plain pointer to an `std::unique_ptr`, making ownership more explicit. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5192 Differential Revision: D15024074 Pulled By: maysamyabandeh fbshipit-source-id: 5b128786d3789cde94e46465c9e91badd07a25d7
6 years ago
}
WriteBatch::WriteBatch(WriteBatch&& src) noexcept
: save_points_(std::move(src.save_points_)),
wal_term_point_(std::move(src.wal_term_point_)),
content_flags_(src.content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed)),
max_bytes_(src.max_bytes_),
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
prot_info_(std::move(src.prot_info_)),
rep_(std::move(src.rep_)) {}
WriteBatch& WriteBatch::operator=(const WriteBatch& src) {
if (&src != this) {
this->~WriteBatch();
new (this) WriteBatch(src);
}
return *this;
}
WriteBatch& WriteBatch::operator=(WriteBatch&& src) {
if (&src != this) {
this->~WriteBatch();
new (this) WriteBatch(std::move(src));
}
return *this;
}
refactor SavePoints (#5192) Summary: Savepoints are assumed to be used in a stack-wise fashion (only the top element should be used), so they were stored by `WriteBatch` in a member variable `save_points` using an std::stack. Conceptually this is fine, but the implementation had a few issues: - the `save_points_` instance variable was a plain pointer to a heap- allocated `SavePoints` struct. The destructor of `WriteBatch` simply deletes this pointer. However, the copy constructor of WriteBatch just copied that pointer, meaning that copying a WriteBatch with active savepoints will very likely have crashed before. Now a proper copy of the savepoints is made in the copy constructor, and not just a copy of the pointer - `save_points_` was an std::stack, which defaults to `std::deque` for the underlying container. A deque is a bit over the top here, as we only need access to the most recent savepoint (i.e. stack.top()) but never any elements at the front. std::deque is rather expensive to initialize in common environments. For example, the STL implementation shipped with GNU g++ will perform a heap allocation of more than 500 bytes to create an empty deque object. Although the `save_points_` container is created lazily by RocksDB, moving from a deque to a plain `std::vector` is much more memory-efficient. So `save_points_` is now a vector. - `save_points_` was changed from a plain pointer to an `std::unique_ptr`, making ownership more explicit. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5192 Differential Revision: D15024074 Pulled By: maysamyabandeh fbshipit-source-id: 5b128786d3789cde94e46465c9e91badd07a25d7
6 years ago
WriteBatch::~WriteBatch() { }
WriteBatch::Handler::~Handler() { }
void WriteBatch::Handler::LogData(const Slice& /*blob*/) {
// If the user has not specified something to do with blobs, then we ignore
// them.
}
bool WriteBatch::Handler::Continue() {
return true;
}
void WriteBatch::Clear() {
rep_.clear();
rep_.resize(WriteBatchInternal::kHeader);
content_flags_.store(0, std::memory_order_relaxed);
if (save_points_ != nullptr) {
while (!save_points_->stack.empty()) {
save_points_->stack.pop();
}
}
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
if (prot_info_ != nullptr) {
prot_info_->entries_.clear();
}
wal_term_point_.clear();
}
uint32_t WriteBatch::Count() const { return WriteBatchInternal::Count(this); }
uint32_t WriteBatch::ComputeContentFlags() const {
auto rv = content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed);
if ((rv & ContentFlags::DEFERRED) != 0) {
BatchContentClassifier classifier;
// Should we handle status here?
Iterate(&classifier).PermitUncheckedError();
rv = classifier.content_flags;
// this method is conceptually const, because it is performing a lazy
// computation that doesn't affect the abstract state of the batch.
// content_flags_ is marked mutable so that we can perform the
// following assignment
content_flags_.store(rv, std::memory_order_relaxed);
}
return rv;
}
void WriteBatch::MarkWalTerminationPoint() {
wal_term_point_.size = GetDataSize();
wal_term_point_.count = Count();
wal_term_point_.content_flags = content_flags_;
}
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
size_t WriteBatch::GetProtectionBytesPerKey() const {
if (prot_info_ != nullptr) {
return prot_info_->GetBytesPerKey();
}
return 0;
}
bool WriteBatch::HasPut() const {
return (ComputeContentFlags() & ContentFlags::HAS_PUT) != 0;
}
bool WriteBatch::HasDelete() const {
return (ComputeContentFlags() & ContentFlags::HAS_DELETE) != 0;
}
bool WriteBatch::HasSingleDelete() const {
return (ComputeContentFlags() & ContentFlags::HAS_SINGLE_DELETE) != 0;
}
bool WriteBatch::HasDeleteRange() const {
return (ComputeContentFlags() & ContentFlags::HAS_DELETE_RANGE) != 0;
}
bool WriteBatch::HasMerge() const {
return (ComputeContentFlags() & ContentFlags::HAS_MERGE) != 0;
}
bool ReadKeyFromWriteBatchEntry(Slice* input, Slice* key, bool cf_record) {
assert(input != nullptr && key != nullptr);
// Skip tag byte
input->remove_prefix(1);
if (cf_record) {
// Skip column_family bytes
uint32_t cf;
if (!GetVarint32(input, &cf)) {
return false;
}
}
// Extract key
return GetLengthPrefixedSlice(input, key);
}
bool WriteBatch::HasBeginPrepare() const {
return (ComputeContentFlags() & ContentFlags::HAS_BEGIN_PREPARE) != 0;
}
bool WriteBatch::HasEndPrepare() const {
return (ComputeContentFlags() & ContentFlags::HAS_END_PREPARE) != 0;
}
bool WriteBatch::HasCommit() const {
return (ComputeContentFlags() & ContentFlags::HAS_COMMIT) != 0;
}
bool WriteBatch::HasRollback() const {
return (ComputeContentFlags() & ContentFlags::HAS_ROLLBACK) != 0;
}
Status ReadRecordFromWriteBatch(Slice* input, char* tag,
uint32_t* column_family, Slice* key,
Slice* value, Slice* blob, Slice* xid) {
assert(key != nullptr && value != nullptr);
*tag = (*input)[0];
input->remove_prefix(1);
*column_family = 0; // default
switch (*tag) {
case kTypeColumnFamilyValue:
if (!GetVarint32(input, column_family)) {
return Status::Corruption("bad WriteBatch Put");
}
FALLTHROUGH_INTENDED;
case kTypeValue:
if (!GetLengthPrefixedSlice(input, key) ||
!GetLengthPrefixedSlice(input, value)) {
return Status::Corruption("bad WriteBatch Put");
}
break;
case kTypeColumnFamilyDeletion:
Support for SingleDelete() Summary: This patch fixes #7460559. It introduces SingleDelete as a new database operation. This operation can be used to delete keys that were never overwritten (no put following another put of the same key). If an overwritten key is single deleted the behavior is undefined. Single deletion of a non-existent key has no effect but multiple consecutive single deletions are not allowed (see limitations). In contrast to the conventional Delete() operation, the deletion entry is removed along with the value when the two are lined up in a compaction. Note: The semantics are similar to @igor's prototype that allowed to have this behavior on the granularity of a column family ( https://reviews.facebook.net/D42093 ). This new patch, however, is more aggressive when it comes to removing tombstones: It removes the SingleDelete together with the value whenever there is no snapshot between them while the older patch only did this when the sequence number of the deletion was older than the earliest snapshot. Most of the complex additions are in the Compaction Iterator, all other changes should be relatively straightforward. The patch also includes basic support for single deletions in db_stress and db_bench. Limitations: - Not compatible with cuckoo hash tables - Single deletions cannot be used in combination with merges and normal deletions on the same key (other keys are not affected by this) - Consecutive single deletions are currently not allowed (and older version of this patch supported this so it could be resurrected if needed) Test Plan: make all check Reviewers: yhchiang, sdong, rven, anthony, yoshinorim, igor Reviewed By: igor Subscribers: maykov, dhruba, leveldb Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D43179
9 years ago
case kTypeColumnFamilySingleDeletion:
if (!GetVarint32(input, column_family)) {
return Status::Corruption("bad WriteBatch Delete");
}
FALLTHROUGH_INTENDED;
case kTypeDeletion:
Support for SingleDelete() Summary: This patch fixes #7460559. It introduces SingleDelete as a new database operation. This operation can be used to delete keys that were never overwritten (no put following another put of the same key). If an overwritten key is single deleted the behavior is undefined. Single deletion of a non-existent key has no effect but multiple consecutive single deletions are not allowed (see limitations). In contrast to the conventional Delete() operation, the deletion entry is removed along with the value when the two are lined up in a compaction. Note: The semantics are similar to @igor's prototype that allowed to have this behavior on the granularity of a column family ( https://reviews.facebook.net/D42093 ). This new patch, however, is more aggressive when it comes to removing tombstones: It removes the SingleDelete together with the value whenever there is no snapshot between them while the older patch only did this when the sequence number of the deletion was older than the earliest snapshot. Most of the complex additions are in the Compaction Iterator, all other changes should be relatively straightforward. The patch also includes basic support for single deletions in db_stress and db_bench. Limitations: - Not compatible with cuckoo hash tables - Single deletions cannot be used in combination with merges and normal deletions on the same key (other keys are not affected by this) - Consecutive single deletions are currently not allowed (and older version of this patch supported this so it could be resurrected if needed) Test Plan: make all check Reviewers: yhchiang, sdong, rven, anthony, yoshinorim, igor Reviewed By: igor Subscribers: maykov, dhruba, leveldb Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D43179
9 years ago
case kTypeSingleDeletion:
if (!GetLengthPrefixedSlice(input, key)) {
return Status::Corruption("bad WriteBatch Delete");
}
break;
case kTypeColumnFamilyRangeDeletion:
if (!GetVarint32(input, column_family)) {
return Status::Corruption("bad WriteBatch DeleteRange");
}
FALLTHROUGH_INTENDED;
case kTypeRangeDeletion:
// for range delete, "key" is begin_key, "value" is end_key
if (!GetLengthPrefixedSlice(input, key) ||
!GetLengthPrefixedSlice(input, value)) {
return Status::Corruption("bad WriteBatch DeleteRange");
}
break;
case kTypeColumnFamilyMerge:
if (!GetVarint32(input, column_family)) {
return Status::Corruption("bad WriteBatch Merge");
}
FALLTHROUGH_INTENDED;
case kTypeMerge:
if (!GetLengthPrefixedSlice(input, key) ||
!GetLengthPrefixedSlice(input, value)) {
return Status::Corruption("bad WriteBatch Merge");
}
break;
case kTypeColumnFamilyBlobIndex:
if (!GetVarint32(input, column_family)) {
return Status::Corruption("bad WriteBatch BlobIndex");
}
FALLTHROUGH_INTENDED;
case kTypeBlobIndex:
if (!GetLengthPrefixedSlice(input, key) ||
!GetLengthPrefixedSlice(input, value)) {
return Status::Corruption("bad WriteBatch BlobIndex");
}
break;
case kTypeLogData:
assert(blob != nullptr);
if (!GetLengthPrefixedSlice(input, blob)) {
return Status::Corruption("bad WriteBatch Blob");
}
break;
case kTypeNoop:
case kTypeBeginPrepareXID:
// This indicates that the prepared batch is also persisted in the db.
// This is used in WritePreparedTxn
case kTypeBeginPersistedPrepareXID:
// This is used in WriteUnpreparedTxn
case kTypeBeginUnprepareXID:
break;
case kTypeEndPrepareXID:
if (!GetLengthPrefixedSlice(input, xid)) {
return Status::Corruption("bad EndPrepare XID");
}
break;
case kTypeCommitXID:
if (!GetLengthPrefixedSlice(input, xid)) {
return Status::Corruption("bad Commit XID");
}
break;
case kTypeRollbackXID:
if (!GetLengthPrefixedSlice(input, xid)) {
return Status::Corruption("bad Rollback XID");
}
break;
default:
return Status::Corruption("unknown WriteBatch tag");
}
return Status::OK();
}
Status WriteBatch::Iterate(Handler* handler) const {
if (rep_.size() < WriteBatchInternal::kHeader) {
return Status::Corruption("malformed WriteBatch (too small)");
}
return WriteBatchInternal::Iterate(this, handler, WriteBatchInternal::kHeader,
rep_.size());
}
Status WriteBatchInternal::Iterate(const WriteBatch* wb,
WriteBatch::Handler* handler, size_t begin,
size_t end) {
if (begin > wb->rep_.size() || end > wb->rep_.size() || end < begin) {
return Status::Corruption("Invalid start/end bounds for Iterate");
}
assert(begin <= end);
Slice input(wb->rep_.data() + begin, static_cast<size_t>(end - begin));
bool whole_batch =
(begin == WriteBatchInternal::kHeader) && (end == wb->rep_.size());
Slice key, value, blob, xid;
// Sometimes a sub-batch starts with a Noop. We want to exclude such Noops as
// the batch boundary symbols otherwise we would mis-count the number of
// batches. We do that by checking whether the accumulated batch is empty
// before seeing the next Noop.
bool empty_batch = true;
uint32_t found = 0;
Status s;
char tag = 0;
uint32_t column_family = 0; // default
bool last_was_try_again = false;
bool handler_continue = true;
while (((s.ok() && !input.empty()) || UNLIKELY(s.IsTryAgain()))) {
handler_continue = handler->Continue();
if (!handler_continue) {
break;
}
if (LIKELY(!s.IsTryAgain())) {
last_was_try_again = false;
tag = 0;
column_family = 0; // default
s = ReadRecordFromWriteBatch(&input, &tag, &column_family, &key, &value,
&blob, &xid);
if (!s.ok()) {
return s;
}
} else {
assert(s.IsTryAgain());
assert(!last_was_try_again); // to detect infinite loop bugs
if (UNLIKELY(last_was_try_again)) {
return Status::Corruption(
"two consecutive TryAgain in WriteBatch handler; this is either a "
"software bug or data corruption.");
}
last_was_try_again = true;
s = Status::OK();
}
switch (tag) {
case kTypeColumnFamilyValue:
case kTypeValue:
assert(wb->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) &
(ContentFlags::DEFERRED | ContentFlags::HAS_PUT));
s = handler->PutCF(column_family, key, value);
if (LIKELY(s.ok())) {
empty_batch = false;
found++;
}
break;
case kTypeColumnFamilyDeletion:
case kTypeDeletion:
assert(wb->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) &
(ContentFlags::DEFERRED | ContentFlags::HAS_DELETE));
s = handler->DeleteCF(column_family, key);
if (LIKELY(s.ok())) {
empty_batch = false;
found++;
}
break;
Support for SingleDelete() Summary: This patch fixes #7460559. It introduces SingleDelete as a new database operation. This operation can be used to delete keys that were never overwritten (no put following another put of the same key). If an overwritten key is single deleted the behavior is undefined. Single deletion of a non-existent key has no effect but multiple consecutive single deletions are not allowed (see limitations). In contrast to the conventional Delete() operation, the deletion entry is removed along with the value when the two are lined up in a compaction. Note: The semantics are similar to @igor's prototype that allowed to have this behavior on the granularity of a column family ( https://reviews.facebook.net/D42093 ). This new patch, however, is more aggressive when it comes to removing tombstones: It removes the SingleDelete together with the value whenever there is no snapshot between them while the older patch only did this when the sequence number of the deletion was older than the earliest snapshot. Most of the complex additions are in the Compaction Iterator, all other changes should be relatively straightforward. The patch also includes basic support for single deletions in db_stress and db_bench. Limitations: - Not compatible with cuckoo hash tables - Single deletions cannot be used in combination with merges and normal deletions on the same key (other keys are not affected by this) - Consecutive single deletions are currently not allowed (and older version of this patch supported this so it could be resurrected if needed) Test Plan: make all check Reviewers: yhchiang, sdong, rven, anthony, yoshinorim, igor Reviewed By: igor Subscribers: maykov, dhruba, leveldb Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D43179
9 years ago
case kTypeColumnFamilySingleDeletion:
case kTypeSingleDeletion:
assert(wb->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) &
(ContentFlags::DEFERRED | ContentFlags::HAS_SINGLE_DELETE));
Support for SingleDelete() Summary: This patch fixes #7460559. It introduces SingleDelete as a new database operation. This operation can be used to delete keys that were never overwritten (no put following another put of the same key). If an overwritten key is single deleted the behavior is undefined. Single deletion of a non-existent key has no effect but multiple consecutive single deletions are not allowed (see limitations). In contrast to the conventional Delete() operation, the deletion entry is removed along with the value when the two are lined up in a compaction. Note: The semantics are similar to @igor's prototype that allowed to have this behavior on the granularity of a column family ( https://reviews.facebook.net/D42093 ). This new patch, however, is more aggressive when it comes to removing tombstones: It removes the SingleDelete together with the value whenever there is no snapshot between them while the older patch only did this when the sequence number of the deletion was older than the earliest snapshot. Most of the complex additions are in the Compaction Iterator, all other changes should be relatively straightforward. The patch also includes basic support for single deletions in db_stress and db_bench. Limitations: - Not compatible with cuckoo hash tables - Single deletions cannot be used in combination with merges and normal deletions on the same key (other keys are not affected by this) - Consecutive single deletions are currently not allowed (and older version of this patch supported this so it could be resurrected if needed) Test Plan: make all check Reviewers: yhchiang, sdong, rven, anthony, yoshinorim, igor Reviewed By: igor Subscribers: maykov, dhruba, leveldb Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D43179
9 years ago
s = handler->SingleDeleteCF(column_family, key);
if (LIKELY(s.ok())) {
empty_batch = false;
found++;
}
Support for SingleDelete() Summary: This patch fixes #7460559. It introduces SingleDelete as a new database operation. This operation can be used to delete keys that were never overwritten (no put following another put of the same key). If an overwritten key is single deleted the behavior is undefined. Single deletion of a non-existent key has no effect but multiple consecutive single deletions are not allowed (see limitations). In contrast to the conventional Delete() operation, the deletion entry is removed along with the value when the two are lined up in a compaction. Note: The semantics are similar to @igor's prototype that allowed to have this behavior on the granularity of a column family ( https://reviews.facebook.net/D42093 ). This new patch, however, is more aggressive when it comes to removing tombstones: It removes the SingleDelete together with the value whenever there is no snapshot between them while the older patch only did this when the sequence number of the deletion was older than the earliest snapshot. Most of the complex additions are in the Compaction Iterator, all other changes should be relatively straightforward. The patch also includes basic support for single deletions in db_stress and db_bench. Limitations: - Not compatible with cuckoo hash tables - Single deletions cannot be used in combination with merges and normal deletions on the same key (other keys are not affected by this) - Consecutive single deletions are currently not allowed (and older version of this patch supported this so it could be resurrected if needed) Test Plan: make all check Reviewers: yhchiang, sdong, rven, anthony, yoshinorim, igor Reviewed By: igor Subscribers: maykov, dhruba, leveldb Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D43179
9 years ago
break;
case kTypeColumnFamilyRangeDeletion:
case kTypeRangeDeletion:
assert(wb->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) &
(ContentFlags::DEFERRED | ContentFlags::HAS_DELETE_RANGE));
s = handler->DeleteRangeCF(column_family, key, value);
if (LIKELY(s.ok())) {
empty_batch = false;
found++;
}
break;
case kTypeColumnFamilyMerge:
case kTypeMerge:
assert(wb->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) &
(ContentFlags::DEFERRED | ContentFlags::HAS_MERGE));
s = handler->MergeCF(column_family, key, value);
if (LIKELY(s.ok())) {
empty_batch = false;
found++;
}
break;
case kTypeColumnFamilyBlobIndex:
case kTypeBlobIndex:
assert(wb->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) &
(ContentFlags::DEFERRED | ContentFlags::HAS_BLOB_INDEX));
s = handler->PutBlobIndexCF(column_family, key, value);
if (LIKELY(s.ok())) {
found++;
}
break;
case kTypeLogData:
handler->LogData(blob);
// A batch might have nothing but LogData. It is still a batch.
empty_batch = false;
break;
case kTypeBeginPrepareXID:
assert(wb->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) &
(ContentFlags::DEFERRED | ContentFlags::HAS_BEGIN_PREPARE));
s = handler->MarkBeginPrepare();
assert(s.ok());
empty_batch = false;
if (!handler->WriteAfterCommit()) {
s = Status::NotSupported(
"WriteCommitted txn tag when write_after_commit_ is disabled (in "
"WritePrepared/WriteUnprepared mode). If it is not due to "
"corruption, the WAL must be emptied before changing the "
"WritePolicy.");
}
if (handler->WriteBeforePrepare()) {
s = Status::NotSupported(
"WriteCommitted txn tag when write_before_prepare_ is enabled "
"(in WriteUnprepared mode). If it is not due to corruption, the "
"WAL must be emptied before changing the WritePolicy.");
}
break;
case kTypeBeginPersistedPrepareXID:
assert(wb->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) &
(ContentFlags::DEFERRED | ContentFlags::HAS_BEGIN_PREPARE));
s = handler->MarkBeginPrepare();
assert(s.ok());
empty_batch = false;
if (handler->WriteAfterCommit()) {
s = Status::NotSupported(
"WritePrepared/WriteUnprepared txn tag when write_after_commit_ "
"is enabled (in default WriteCommitted mode). If it is not due "
"to corruption, the WAL must be emptied before changing the "
"WritePolicy.");
}
break;
case kTypeBeginUnprepareXID:
assert(wb->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) &
(ContentFlags::DEFERRED | ContentFlags::HAS_BEGIN_UNPREPARE));
s = handler->MarkBeginPrepare(true /* unprepared */);
assert(s.ok());
empty_batch = false;
if (handler->WriteAfterCommit()) {
s = Status::NotSupported(
"WriteUnprepared txn tag when write_after_commit_ is enabled (in "
"default WriteCommitted mode). If it is not due to corruption, "
"the WAL must be emptied before changing the WritePolicy.");
}
if (!handler->WriteBeforePrepare()) {
s = Status::NotSupported(
"WriteUnprepared txn tag when write_before_prepare_ is disabled "
"(in WriteCommitted/WritePrepared mode). If it is not due to "
"corruption, the WAL must be emptied before changing the "
"WritePolicy.");
}
break;
case kTypeEndPrepareXID:
assert(wb->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) &
(ContentFlags::DEFERRED | ContentFlags::HAS_END_PREPARE));
s = handler->MarkEndPrepare(xid);
assert(s.ok());
empty_batch = true;
break;
case kTypeCommitXID:
assert(wb->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) &
(ContentFlags::DEFERRED | ContentFlags::HAS_COMMIT));
s = handler->MarkCommit(xid);
assert(s.ok());
empty_batch = true;
break;
case kTypeRollbackXID:
assert(wb->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) &
(ContentFlags::DEFERRED | ContentFlags::HAS_ROLLBACK));
s = handler->MarkRollback(xid);
assert(s.ok());
empty_batch = true;
break;
case kTypeNoop:
s = handler->MarkNoop(empty_batch);
assert(s.ok());
empty_batch = true;
break;
default:
return Status::Corruption("unknown WriteBatch tag");
}
}
if (!s.ok()) {
return s;
}
if (handler_continue && whole_batch &&
found != WriteBatchInternal::Count(wb)) {
return Status::Corruption("WriteBatch has wrong count");
} else {
return Status::OK();
}
}
bool WriteBatchInternal::IsLatestPersistentState(const WriteBatch* b) {
return b->is_latest_persistent_state_;
}
void WriteBatchInternal::SetAsLatestPersistentState(WriteBatch* b) {
b->is_latest_persistent_state_ = true;
}
uint32_t WriteBatchInternal::Count(const WriteBatch* b) {
return DecodeFixed32(b->rep_.data() + 8);
}
void WriteBatchInternal::SetCount(WriteBatch* b, uint32_t n) {
EncodeFixed32(&b->rep_[8], n);
}
SequenceNumber WriteBatchInternal::Sequence(const WriteBatch* b) {
return SequenceNumber(DecodeFixed64(b->rep_.data()));
}
void WriteBatchInternal::SetSequence(WriteBatch* b, SequenceNumber seq) {
EncodeFixed64(&b->rep_[0], seq);
}
size_t WriteBatchInternal::GetFirstOffset(WriteBatch* /*b*/) {
return WriteBatchInternal::kHeader;
}
Status WriteBatchInternal::Put(WriteBatch* b, uint32_t column_family_id,
const Slice& key, const Slice& value) {
if (key.size() > size_t{port::kMaxUint32}) {
return Status::InvalidArgument("key is too large");
}
if (value.size() > size_t{port::kMaxUint32}) {
return Status::InvalidArgument("value is too large");
}
LocalSavePoint save(b);
WriteBatchInternal::SetCount(b, WriteBatchInternal::Count(b) + 1);
if (column_family_id == 0) {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeValue));
} else {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeColumnFamilyValue));
PutVarint32(&b->rep_, column_family_id);
}
PutLengthPrefixedSlice(&b->rep_, key);
PutLengthPrefixedSlice(&b->rep_, value);
b->content_flags_.store(
b->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) | ContentFlags::HAS_PUT,
std::memory_order_relaxed);
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
if (b->prot_info_ != nullptr) {
// Technically the optype could've been `kTypeColumnFamilyValue` with the
// CF ID encoded in the `WriteBatch`. That distinction is unimportant
// however since we verify CF ID is correct, as well as all other fields
// (a missing/extra encoded CF ID would corrupt another field). It is
// convenient to consolidate on `kTypeValue` here as that is what will be
// inserted into memtable.
b->prot_info_->entries_.emplace_back(ProtectionInfo64()
.ProtectKVO(key, value, kTypeValue)
.ProtectC(column_family_id));
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
}
return save.commit();
}
Status WriteBatch::Put(ColumnFamilyHandle* column_family, const Slice& key,
const Slice& value) {
return WriteBatchInternal::Put(this, GetColumnFamilyID(column_family), key,
value);
}
Status WriteBatchInternal::CheckSlicePartsLength(const SliceParts& key,
const SliceParts& value) {
size_t total_key_bytes = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < key.num_parts; ++i) {
total_key_bytes += key.parts[i].size();
}
if (total_key_bytes >= size_t{port::kMaxUint32}) {
return Status::InvalidArgument("key is too large");
}
size_t total_value_bytes = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < value.num_parts; ++i) {
total_value_bytes += value.parts[i].size();
}
if (total_value_bytes >= size_t{port::kMaxUint32}) {
return Status::InvalidArgument("value is too large");
}
return Status::OK();
}
Status WriteBatchInternal::Put(WriteBatch* b, uint32_t column_family_id,
const SliceParts& key, const SliceParts& value) {
Status s = CheckSlicePartsLength(key, value);
if (!s.ok()) {
return s;
}
LocalSavePoint save(b);
WriteBatchInternal::SetCount(b, WriteBatchInternal::Count(b) + 1);
if (column_family_id == 0) {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeValue));
} else {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeColumnFamilyValue));
PutVarint32(&b->rep_, column_family_id);
}
PutLengthPrefixedSliceParts(&b->rep_, key);
PutLengthPrefixedSliceParts(&b->rep_, value);
b->content_flags_.store(
b->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) | ContentFlags::HAS_PUT,
std::memory_order_relaxed);
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
if (b->prot_info_ != nullptr) {
// See comment in first `WriteBatchInternal::Put()` overload concerning the
// `ValueType` argument passed to `ProtectKVO()`.
b->prot_info_->entries_.emplace_back(ProtectionInfo64()
.ProtectKVO(key, value, kTypeValue)
.ProtectC(column_family_id));
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
}
return save.commit();
}
Status WriteBatch::Put(ColumnFamilyHandle* column_family, const SliceParts& key,
const SliceParts& value) {
return WriteBatchInternal::Put(this, GetColumnFamilyID(column_family), key,
value);
}
Status WriteBatchInternal::InsertNoop(WriteBatch* b) {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeNoop));
return Status::OK();
}
Status WriteBatchInternal::MarkEndPrepare(WriteBatch* b, const Slice& xid,
bool write_after_commit,
bool unprepared_batch) {
// a manually constructed batch can only contain one prepare section
assert(b->rep_[12] == static_cast<char>(kTypeNoop));
// all savepoints up to this point are cleared
if (b->save_points_ != nullptr) {
while (!b->save_points_->stack.empty()) {
b->save_points_->stack.pop();
}
}
// rewrite noop as begin marker
b->rep_[12] = static_cast<char>(
write_after_commit ? kTypeBeginPrepareXID
: (unprepared_batch ? kTypeBeginUnprepareXID
: kTypeBeginPersistedPrepareXID));
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeEndPrepareXID));
PutLengthPrefixedSlice(&b->rep_, xid);
b->content_flags_.store(b->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) |
ContentFlags::HAS_END_PREPARE |
ContentFlags::HAS_BEGIN_PREPARE,
std::memory_order_relaxed);
if (unprepared_batch) {
b->content_flags_.store(b->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) |
ContentFlags::HAS_BEGIN_UNPREPARE,
std::memory_order_relaxed);
}
return Status::OK();
}
Status WriteBatchInternal::MarkCommit(WriteBatch* b, const Slice& xid) {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeCommitXID));
PutLengthPrefixedSlice(&b->rep_, xid);
b->content_flags_.store(b->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) |
ContentFlags::HAS_COMMIT,
std::memory_order_relaxed);
return Status::OK();
}
Status WriteBatchInternal::MarkRollback(WriteBatch* b, const Slice& xid) {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeRollbackXID));
PutLengthPrefixedSlice(&b->rep_, xid);
b->content_flags_.store(b->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) |
ContentFlags::HAS_ROLLBACK,
std::memory_order_relaxed);
return Status::OK();
}
Status WriteBatchInternal::Delete(WriteBatch* b, uint32_t column_family_id,
const Slice& key) {
LocalSavePoint save(b);
WriteBatchInternal::SetCount(b, WriteBatchInternal::Count(b) + 1);
if (column_family_id == 0) {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeDeletion));
} else {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeColumnFamilyDeletion));
PutVarint32(&b->rep_, column_family_id);
}
PutLengthPrefixedSlice(&b->rep_, key);
b->content_flags_.store(b->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) |
ContentFlags::HAS_DELETE,
std::memory_order_relaxed);
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
if (b->prot_info_ != nullptr) {
// See comment in first `WriteBatchInternal::Put()` overload concerning the
// `ValueType` argument passed to `ProtectKVO()`.
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
b->prot_info_->entries_.emplace_back(
ProtectionInfo64()
.ProtectKVO(key, "" /* value */, kTypeDeletion)
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
.ProtectC(column_family_id));
}
return save.commit();
}
Status WriteBatch::Delete(ColumnFamilyHandle* column_family, const Slice& key) {
return WriteBatchInternal::Delete(this, GetColumnFamilyID(column_family),
key);
}
Status WriteBatchInternal::Delete(WriteBatch* b, uint32_t column_family_id,
const SliceParts& key) {
LocalSavePoint save(b);
WriteBatchInternal::SetCount(b, WriteBatchInternal::Count(b) + 1);
if (column_family_id == 0) {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeDeletion));
} else {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeColumnFamilyDeletion));
PutVarint32(&b->rep_, column_family_id);
}
PutLengthPrefixedSliceParts(&b->rep_, key);
b->content_flags_.store(b->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) |
ContentFlags::HAS_DELETE,
std::memory_order_relaxed);
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
if (b->prot_info_ != nullptr) {
// See comment in first `WriteBatchInternal::Put()` overload concerning the
// `ValueType` argument passed to `ProtectKVO()`.
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
b->prot_info_->entries_.emplace_back(
ProtectionInfo64()
.ProtectKVO(key,
SliceParts(nullptr /* _parts */, 0 /* _num_parts */),
kTypeDeletion)
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
.ProtectC(column_family_id));
}
return save.commit();
}
Status WriteBatch::Delete(ColumnFamilyHandle* column_family,
const SliceParts& key) {
return WriteBatchInternal::Delete(this, GetColumnFamilyID(column_family),
key);
}
Status WriteBatchInternal::SingleDelete(WriteBatch* b,
uint32_t column_family_id,
const Slice& key) {
LocalSavePoint save(b);
Support for SingleDelete() Summary: This patch fixes #7460559. It introduces SingleDelete as a new database operation. This operation can be used to delete keys that were never overwritten (no put following another put of the same key). If an overwritten key is single deleted the behavior is undefined. Single deletion of a non-existent key has no effect but multiple consecutive single deletions are not allowed (see limitations). In contrast to the conventional Delete() operation, the deletion entry is removed along with the value when the two are lined up in a compaction. Note: The semantics are similar to @igor's prototype that allowed to have this behavior on the granularity of a column family ( https://reviews.facebook.net/D42093 ). This new patch, however, is more aggressive when it comes to removing tombstones: It removes the SingleDelete together with the value whenever there is no snapshot between them while the older patch only did this when the sequence number of the deletion was older than the earliest snapshot. Most of the complex additions are in the Compaction Iterator, all other changes should be relatively straightforward. The patch also includes basic support for single deletions in db_stress and db_bench. Limitations: - Not compatible with cuckoo hash tables - Single deletions cannot be used in combination with merges and normal deletions on the same key (other keys are not affected by this) - Consecutive single deletions are currently not allowed (and older version of this patch supported this so it could be resurrected if needed) Test Plan: make all check Reviewers: yhchiang, sdong, rven, anthony, yoshinorim, igor Reviewed By: igor Subscribers: maykov, dhruba, leveldb Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D43179
9 years ago
WriteBatchInternal::SetCount(b, WriteBatchInternal::Count(b) + 1);
if (column_family_id == 0) {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeSingleDeletion));
} else {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeColumnFamilySingleDeletion));
PutVarint32(&b->rep_, column_family_id);
}
PutLengthPrefixedSlice(&b->rep_, key);
b->content_flags_.store(b->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) |
ContentFlags::HAS_SINGLE_DELETE,
std::memory_order_relaxed);
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
if (b->prot_info_ != nullptr) {
// See comment in first `WriteBatchInternal::Put()` overload concerning the
// `ValueType` argument passed to `ProtectKVO()`.
b->prot_info_->entries_.emplace_back(
ProtectionInfo64()
.ProtectKVO(key, "" /* value */, kTypeSingleDeletion)
.ProtectC(column_family_id));
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
}
return save.commit();
Support for SingleDelete() Summary: This patch fixes #7460559. It introduces SingleDelete as a new database operation. This operation can be used to delete keys that were never overwritten (no put following another put of the same key). If an overwritten key is single deleted the behavior is undefined. Single deletion of a non-existent key has no effect but multiple consecutive single deletions are not allowed (see limitations). In contrast to the conventional Delete() operation, the deletion entry is removed along with the value when the two are lined up in a compaction. Note: The semantics are similar to @igor's prototype that allowed to have this behavior on the granularity of a column family ( https://reviews.facebook.net/D42093 ). This new patch, however, is more aggressive when it comes to removing tombstones: It removes the SingleDelete together with the value whenever there is no snapshot between them while the older patch only did this when the sequence number of the deletion was older than the earliest snapshot. Most of the complex additions are in the Compaction Iterator, all other changes should be relatively straightforward. The patch also includes basic support for single deletions in db_stress and db_bench. Limitations: - Not compatible with cuckoo hash tables - Single deletions cannot be used in combination with merges and normal deletions on the same key (other keys are not affected by this) - Consecutive single deletions are currently not allowed (and older version of this patch supported this so it could be resurrected if needed) Test Plan: make all check Reviewers: yhchiang, sdong, rven, anthony, yoshinorim, igor Reviewed By: igor Subscribers: maykov, dhruba, leveldb Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D43179
9 years ago
}
Status WriteBatch::SingleDelete(ColumnFamilyHandle* column_family,
const Slice& key) {
return WriteBatchInternal::SingleDelete(
this, GetColumnFamilyID(column_family), key);
Support for SingleDelete() Summary: This patch fixes #7460559. It introduces SingleDelete as a new database operation. This operation can be used to delete keys that were never overwritten (no put following another put of the same key). If an overwritten key is single deleted the behavior is undefined. Single deletion of a non-existent key has no effect but multiple consecutive single deletions are not allowed (see limitations). In contrast to the conventional Delete() operation, the deletion entry is removed along with the value when the two are lined up in a compaction. Note: The semantics are similar to @igor's prototype that allowed to have this behavior on the granularity of a column family ( https://reviews.facebook.net/D42093 ). This new patch, however, is more aggressive when it comes to removing tombstones: It removes the SingleDelete together with the value whenever there is no snapshot between them while the older patch only did this when the sequence number of the deletion was older than the earliest snapshot. Most of the complex additions are in the Compaction Iterator, all other changes should be relatively straightforward. The patch also includes basic support for single deletions in db_stress and db_bench. Limitations: - Not compatible with cuckoo hash tables - Single deletions cannot be used in combination with merges and normal deletions on the same key (other keys are not affected by this) - Consecutive single deletions are currently not allowed (and older version of this patch supported this so it could be resurrected if needed) Test Plan: make all check Reviewers: yhchiang, sdong, rven, anthony, yoshinorim, igor Reviewed By: igor Subscribers: maykov, dhruba, leveldb Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D43179
9 years ago
}
Status WriteBatchInternal::SingleDelete(WriteBatch* b,
uint32_t column_family_id,
const SliceParts& key) {
LocalSavePoint save(b);
Support for SingleDelete() Summary: This patch fixes #7460559. It introduces SingleDelete as a new database operation. This operation can be used to delete keys that were never overwritten (no put following another put of the same key). If an overwritten key is single deleted the behavior is undefined. Single deletion of a non-existent key has no effect but multiple consecutive single deletions are not allowed (see limitations). In contrast to the conventional Delete() operation, the deletion entry is removed along with the value when the two are lined up in a compaction. Note: The semantics are similar to @igor's prototype that allowed to have this behavior on the granularity of a column family ( https://reviews.facebook.net/D42093 ). This new patch, however, is more aggressive when it comes to removing tombstones: It removes the SingleDelete together with the value whenever there is no snapshot between them while the older patch only did this when the sequence number of the deletion was older than the earliest snapshot. Most of the complex additions are in the Compaction Iterator, all other changes should be relatively straightforward. The patch also includes basic support for single deletions in db_stress and db_bench. Limitations: - Not compatible with cuckoo hash tables - Single deletions cannot be used in combination with merges and normal deletions on the same key (other keys are not affected by this) - Consecutive single deletions are currently not allowed (and older version of this patch supported this so it could be resurrected if needed) Test Plan: make all check Reviewers: yhchiang, sdong, rven, anthony, yoshinorim, igor Reviewed By: igor Subscribers: maykov, dhruba, leveldb Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D43179
9 years ago
WriteBatchInternal::SetCount(b, WriteBatchInternal::Count(b) + 1);
if (column_family_id == 0) {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeSingleDeletion));
} else {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeColumnFamilySingleDeletion));
PutVarint32(&b->rep_, column_family_id);
}
PutLengthPrefixedSliceParts(&b->rep_, key);
b->content_flags_.store(b->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) |
ContentFlags::HAS_SINGLE_DELETE,
std::memory_order_relaxed);
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
if (b->prot_info_ != nullptr) {
// See comment in first `WriteBatchInternal::Put()` overload concerning the
// `ValueType` argument passed to `ProtectKVO()`.
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
b->prot_info_->entries_.emplace_back(
ProtectionInfo64()
.ProtectKVO(key,
SliceParts(nullptr /* _parts */,
0 /* _num_parts */) /* value */,
kTypeSingleDeletion)
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
.ProtectC(column_family_id));
}
return save.commit();
Support for SingleDelete() Summary: This patch fixes #7460559. It introduces SingleDelete as a new database operation. This operation can be used to delete keys that were never overwritten (no put following another put of the same key). If an overwritten key is single deleted the behavior is undefined. Single deletion of a non-existent key has no effect but multiple consecutive single deletions are not allowed (see limitations). In contrast to the conventional Delete() operation, the deletion entry is removed along with the value when the two are lined up in a compaction. Note: The semantics are similar to @igor's prototype that allowed to have this behavior on the granularity of a column family ( https://reviews.facebook.net/D42093 ). This new patch, however, is more aggressive when it comes to removing tombstones: It removes the SingleDelete together with the value whenever there is no snapshot between them while the older patch only did this when the sequence number of the deletion was older than the earliest snapshot. Most of the complex additions are in the Compaction Iterator, all other changes should be relatively straightforward. The patch also includes basic support for single deletions in db_stress and db_bench. Limitations: - Not compatible with cuckoo hash tables - Single deletions cannot be used in combination with merges and normal deletions on the same key (other keys are not affected by this) - Consecutive single deletions are currently not allowed (and older version of this patch supported this so it could be resurrected if needed) Test Plan: make all check Reviewers: yhchiang, sdong, rven, anthony, yoshinorim, igor Reviewed By: igor Subscribers: maykov, dhruba, leveldb Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D43179
9 years ago
}
Status WriteBatch::SingleDelete(ColumnFamilyHandle* column_family,
const SliceParts& key) {
return WriteBatchInternal::SingleDelete(
this, GetColumnFamilyID(column_family), key);
Support for SingleDelete() Summary: This patch fixes #7460559. It introduces SingleDelete as a new database operation. This operation can be used to delete keys that were never overwritten (no put following another put of the same key). If an overwritten key is single deleted the behavior is undefined. Single deletion of a non-existent key has no effect but multiple consecutive single deletions are not allowed (see limitations). In contrast to the conventional Delete() operation, the deletion entry is removed along with the value when the two are lined up in a compaction. Note: The semantics are similar to @igor's prototype that allowed to have this behavior on the granularity of a column family ( https://reviews.facebook.net/D42093 ). This new patch, however, is more aggressive when it comes to removing tombstones: It removes the SingleDelete together with the value whenever there is no snapshot between them while the older patch only did this when the sequence number of the deletion was older than the earliest snapshot. Most of the complex additions are in the Compaction Iterator, all other changes should be relatively straightforward. The patch also includes basic support for single deletions in db_stress and db_bench. Limitations: - Not compatible with cuckoo hash tables - Single deletions cannot be used in combination with merges and normal deletions on the same key (other keys are not affected by this) - Consecutive single deletions are currently not allowed (and older version of this patch supported this so it could be resurrected if needed) Test Plan: make all check Reviewers: yhchiang, sdong, rven, anthony, yoshinorim, igor Reviewed By: igor Subscribers: maykov, dhruba, leveldb Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D43179
9 years ago
}
Status WriteBatchInternal::DeleteRange(WriteBatch* b, uint32_t column_family_id,
const Slice& begin_key,
const Slice& end_key) {
LocalSavePoint save(b);
WriteBatchInternal::SetCount(b, WriteBatchInternal::Count(b) + 1);
if (column_family_id == 0) {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeRangeDeletion));
} else {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeColumnFamilyRangeDeletion));
PutVarint32(&b->rep_, column_family_id);
}
PutLengthPrefixedSlice(&b->rep_, begin_key);
PutLengthPrefixedSlice(&b->rep_, end_key);
b->content_flags_.store(b->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) |
ContentFlags::HAS_DELETE_RANGE,
std::memory_order_relaxed);
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
if (b->prot_info_ != nullptr) {
// See comment in first `WriteBatchInternal::Put()` overload concerning the
// `ValueType` argument passed to `ProtectKVO()`.
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
// In `DeleteRange()`, the end key is treated as the value.
b->prot_info_->entries_.emplace_back(
ProtectionInfo64()
.ProtectKVO(begin_key, end_key, kTypeRangeDeletion)
.ProtectC(column_family_id));
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
}
return save.commit();
}
Status WriteBatch::DeleteRange(ColumnFamilyHandle* column_family,
const Slice& begin_key, const Slice& end_key) {
return WriteBatchInternal::DeleteRange(this, GetColumnFamilyID(column_family),
begin_key, end_key);
}
Status WriteBatchInternal::DeleteRange(WriteBatch* b, uint32_t column_family_id,
const SliceParts& begin_key,
const SliceParts& end_key) {
LocalSavePoint save(b);
WriteBatchInternal::SetCount(b, WriteBatchInternal::Count(b) + 1);
if (column_family_id == 0) {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeRangeDeletion));
} else {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeColumnFamilyRangeDeletion));
PutVarint32(&b->rep_, column_family_id);
}
PutLengthPrefixedSliceParts(&b->rep_, begin_key);
PutLengthPrefixedSliceParts(&b->rep_, end_key);
b->content_flags_.store(b->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) |
ContentFlags::HAS_DELETE_RANGE,
std::memory_order_relaxed);
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
if (b->prot_info_ != nullptr) {
// See comment in first `WriteBatchInternal::Put()` overload concerning the
// `ValueType` argument passed to `ProtectKVO()`.
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
// In `DeleteRange()`, the end key is treated as the value.
b->prot_info_->entries_.emplace_back(
ProtectionInfo64()
.ProtectKVO(begin_key, end_key, kTypeRangeDeletion)
.ProtectC(column_family_id));
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
}
return save.commit();
}
Status WriteBatch::DeleteRange(ColumnFamilyHandle* column_family,
const SliceParts& begin_key,
const SliceParts& end_key) {
return WriteBatchInternal::DeleteRange(this, GetColumnFamilyID(column_family),
begin_key, end_key);
}
Status WriteBatchInternal::Merge(WriteBatch* b, uint32_t column_family_id,
const Slice& key, const Slice& value) {
if (key.size() > size_t{port::kMaxUint32}) {
return Status::InvalidArgument("key is too large");
}
if (value.size() > size_t{port::kMaxUint32}) {
return Status::InvalidArgument("value is too large");
}
LocalSavePoint save(b);
WriteBatchInternal::SetCount(b, WriteBatchInternal::Count(b) + 1);
if (column_family_id == 0) {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeMerge));
} else {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeColumnFamilyMerge));
PutVarint32(&b->rep_, column_family_id);
}
PutLengthPrefixedSlice(&b->rep_, key);
PutLengthPrefixedSlice(&b->rep_, value);
b->content_flags_.store(b->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) |
ContentFlags::HAS_MERGE,
std::memory_order_relaxed);
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
if (b->prot_info_ != nullptr) {
// See comment in first `WriteBatchInternal::Put()` overload concerning the
// `ValueType` argument passed to `ProtectKVO()`.
b->prot_info_->entries_.emplace_back(ProtectionInfo64()
.ProtectKVO(key, value, kTypeMerge)
.ProtectC(column_family_id));
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
}
return save.commit();
}
Status WriteBatch::Merge(ColumnFamilyHandle* column_family, const Slice& key,
const Slice& value) {
return WriteBatchInternal::Merge(this, GetColumnFamilyID(column_family), key,
value);
}
Status WriteBatchInternal::Merge(WriteBatch* b, uint32_t column_family_id,
const SliceParts& key,
const SliceParts& value) {
Status s = CheckSlicePartsLength(key, value);
if (!s.ok()) {
return s;
}
LocalSavePoint save(b);
WriteBatchInternal::SetCount(b, WriteBatchInternal::Count(b) + 1);
if (column_family_id == 0) {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeMerge));
} else {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeColumnFamilyMerge));
PutVarint32(&b->rep_, column_family_id);
}
PutLengthPrefixedSliceParts(&b->rep_, key);
PutLengthPrefixedSliceParts(&b->rep_, value);
b->content_flags_.store(b->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) |
ContentFlags::HAS_MERGE,
std::memory_order_relaxed);
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
if (b->prot_info_ != nullptr) {
// See comment in first `WriteBatchInternal::Put()` overload concerning the
// `ValueType` argument passed to `ProtectKVO()`.
b->prot_info_->entries_.emplace_back(ProtectionInfo64()
.ProtectKVO(key, value, kTypeMerge)
.ProtectC(column_family_id));
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
}
return save.commit();
}
Status WriteBatch::Merge(ColumnFamilyHandle* column_family,
const SliceParts& key, const SliceParts& value) {
return WriteBatchInternal::Merge(this, GetColumnFamilyID(column_family), key,
value);
}
Status WriteBatchInternal::PutBlobIndex(WriteBatch* b,
uint32_t column_family_id,
const Slice& key, const Slice& value) {
LocalSavePoint save(b);
WriteBatchInternal::SetCount(b, WriteBatchInternal::Count(b) + 1);
if (column_family_id == 0) {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeBlobIndex));
} else {
b->rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeColumnFamilyBlobIndex));
PutVarint32(&b->rep_, column_family_id);
}
PutLengthPrefixedSlice(&b->rep_, key);
PutLengthPrefixedSlice(&b->rep_, value);
b->content_flags_.store(b->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) |
ContentFlags::HAS_BLOB_INDEX,
std::memory_order_relaxed);
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
if (b->prot_info_ != nullptr) {
// See comment in first `WriteBatchInternal::Put()` overload concerning the
// `ValueType` argument passed to `ProtectKVO()`.
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
b->prot_info_->entries_.emplace_back(
ProtectionInfo64()
.ProtectKVO(key, value, kTypeBlobIndex)
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
.ProtectC(column_family_id));
}
return save.commit();
}
Status WriteBatch::PutLogData(const Slice& blob) {
LocalSavePoint save(this);
rep_.push_back(static_cast<char>(kTypeLogData));
PutLengthPrefixedSlice(&rep_, blob);
return save.commit();
}
void WriteBatch::SetSavePoint() {
if (save_points_ == nullptr) {
refactor SavePoints (#5192) Summary: Savepoints are assumed to be used in a stack-wise fashion (only the top element should be used), so they were stored by `WriteBatch` in a member variable `save_points` using an std::stack. Conceptually this is fine, but the implementation had a few issues: - the `save_points_` instance variable was a plain pointer to a heap- allocated `SavePoints` struct. The destructor of `WriteBatch` simply deletes this pointer. However, the copy constructor of WriteBatch just copied that pointer, meaning that copying a WriteBatch with active savepoints will very likely have crashed before. Now a proper copy of the savepoints is made in the copy constructor, and not just a copy of the pointer - `save_points_` was an std::stack, which defaults to `std::deque` for the underlying container. A deque is a bit over the top here, as we only need access to the most recent savepoint (i.e. stack.top()) but never any elements at the front. std::deque is rather expensive to initialize in common environments. For example, the STL implementation shipped with GNU g++ will perform a heap allocation of more than 500 bytes to create an empty deque object. Although the `save_points_` container is created lazily by RocksDB, moving from a deque to a plain `std::vector` is much more memory-efficient. So `save_points_` is now a vector. - `save_points_` was changed from a plain pointer to an `std::unique_ptr`, making ownership more explicit. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5192 Differential Revision: D15024074 Pulled By: maysamyabandeh fbshipit-source-id: 5b128786d3789cde94e46465c9e91badd07a25d7
6 years ago
save_points_.reset(new SavePoints());
}
// Record length and count of current batch of writes.
save_points_->stack.push(SavePoint(
GetDataSize(), Count(), content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed)));
}
Status WriteBatch::RollbackToSavePoint() {
if (save_points_ == nullptr || save_points_->stack.size() == 0) {
return Status::NotFound();
}
// Pop the most recent savepoint off the stack
SavePoint savepoint = save_points_->stack.top();
save_points_->stack.pop();
assert(savepoint.size <= rep_.size());
assert(static_cast<uint32_t>(savepoint.count) <= Count());
if (savepoint.size == rep_.size()) {
// No changes to rollback
} else if (savepoint.size == 0) {
// Rollback everything
Clear();
} else {
rep_.resize(savepoint.size);
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
if (prot_info_ != nullptr) {
prot_info_->entries_.resize(savepoint.count);
}
WriteBatchInternal::SetCount(this, savepoint.count);
content_flags_.store(savepoint.content_flags, std::memory_order_relaxed);
}
return Status::OK();
}
Status WriteBatch::PopSavePoint() {
if (save_points_ == nullptr || save_points_->stack.size() == 0) {
return Status::NotFound();
}
// Pop the most recent savepoint off the stack
save_points_->stack.pop();
return Status::OK();
}
Avoid user key copying for Get/Put/Write with user-timestamp (#5502) Summary: In previous https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/issues/5079, we added user-specified timestamp to `DB::Get()` and `DB::Put()`. Limitation is that these two functions may cause extra memory allocation and key copy. The reason is that `WriteBatch` does not allocate extra memory for timestamps because it is not aware of timestamp size, and we did not provide an API to assign/update timestamp of each key within a `WriteBatch`. We address these issues in this PR by doing the following. 1. Add a `timestamp_size_` to `WriteBatch` so that `WriteBatch` can take timestamps into account when calling `WriteBatch::Put`, `WriteBatch::Delete`, etc. 2. Add APIs `WriteBatch::AssignTimestamp` and `WriteBatch::AssignTimestamps` so that application can assign/update timestamps for each key in a `WriteBatch`. 3. Avoid key copy in `GetImpl` by adding new constructor to `LookupKey`. Test plan (on devserver): ``` $make clean && COMPILE_WITH_ASAN=1 make -j32 all $./db_basic_test --gtest_filter=Timestamp/DBBasicTestWithTimestampWithParam.PutAndGet/* $make check ``` If the API extension looks good, I will add more unit tests. Some simple benchmark using db_bench. ``` $rm -rf /dev/shm/dbbench/* && TEST_TMPDIR=/dev/shm ./db_bench -benchmarks=fillseq,readrandom -num=1000000 $rm -rf /dev/shm/dbbench/* && TEST_TMPDIR=/dev/shm ./db_bench -benchmarks=fillrandom -num=1000000 -disable_wal=true ``` Master is at a78503bd6c80a3c4137df1962a972fe406b4d90b. ``` | | readrandom | fillrandom | | master | 15.53 MB/s | 25.97 MB/s | | PR5502 | 16.70 MB/s | 25.80 MB/s | ``` Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5502 Differential Revision: D16340894 Pulled By: riversand963 fbshipit-source-id: 51132cf792be07d1efc3ac33f5768c4ee2608bb8
5 years ago
Status WriteBatch::AssignTimestamp(const Slice& ts) {
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
TimestampAssigner ts_assigner(ts, prot_info_.get());
Avoid user key copying for Get/Put/Write with user-timestamp (#5502) Summary: In previous https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/issues/5079, we added user-specified timestamp to `DB::Get()` and `DB::Put()`. Limitation is that these two functions may cause extra memory allocation and key copy. The reason is that `WriteBatch` does not allocate extra memory for timestamps because it is not aware of timestamp size, and we did not provide an API to assign/update timestamp of each key within a `WriteBatch`. We address these issues in this PR by doing the following. 1. Add a `timestamp_size_` to `WriteBatch` so that `WriteBatch` can take timestamps into account when calling `WriteBatch::Put`, `WriteBatch::Delete`, etc. 2. Add APIs `WriteBatch::AssignTimestamp` and `WriteBatch::AssignTimestamps` so that application can assign/update timestamps for each key in a `WriteBatch`. 3. Avoid key copy in `GetImpl` by adding new constructor to `LookupKey`. Test plan (on devserver): ``` $make clean && COMPILE_WITH_ASAN=1 make -j32 all $./db_basic_test --gtest_filter=Timestamp/DBBasicTestWithTimestampWithParam.PutAndGet/* $make check ``` If the API extension looks good, I will add more unit tests. Some simple benchmark using db_bench. ``` $rm -rf /dev/shm/dbbench/* && TEST_TMPDIR=/dev/shm ./db_bench -benchmarks=fillseq,readrandom -num=1000000 $rm -rf /dev/shm/dbbench/* && TEST_TMPDIR=/dev/shm ./db_bench -benchmarks=fillrandom -num=1000000 -disable_wal=true ``` Master is at a78503bd6c80a3c4137df1962a972fe406b4d90b. ``` | | readrandom | fillrandom | | master | 15.53 MB/s | 25.97 MB/s | | PR5502 | 16.70 MB/s | 25.80 MB/s | ``` Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5502 Differential Revision: D16340894 Pulled By: riversand963 fbshipit-source-id: 51132cf792be07d1efc3ac33f5768c4ee2608bb8
5 years ago
return Iterate(&ts_assigner);
}
Status WriteBatch::AssignTimestamps(const std::vector<Slice>& ts_list) {
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
TimestampAssigner ts_assigner(ts_list, prot_info_.get());
Avoid user key copying for Get/Put/Write with user-timestamp (#5502) Summary: In previous https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/issues/5079, we added user-specified timestamp to `DB::Get()` and `DB::Put()`. Limitation is that these two functions may cause extra memory allocation and key copy. The reason is that `WriteBatch` does not allocate extra memory for timestamps because it is not aware of timestamp size, and we did not provide an API to assign/update timestamp of each key within a `WriteBatch`. We address these issues in this PR by doing the following. 1. Add a `timestamp_size_` to `WriteBatch` so that `WriteBatch` can take timestamps into account when calling `WriteBatch::Put`, `WriteBatch::Delete`, etc. 2. Add APIs `WriteBatch::AssignTimestamp` and `WriteBatch::AssignTimestamps` so that application can assign/update timestamps for each key in a `WriteBatch`. 3. Avoid key copy in `GetImpl` by adding new constructor to `LookupKey`. Test plan (on devserver): ``` $make clean && COMPILE_WITH_ASAN=1 make -j32 all $./db_basic_test --gtest_filter=Timestamp/DBBasicTestWithTimestampWithParam.PutAndGet/* $make check ``` If the API extension looks good, I will add more unit tests. Some simple benchmark using db_bench. ``` $rm -rf /dev/shm/dbbench/* && TEST_TMPDIR=/dev/shm ./db_bench -benchmarks=fillseq,readrandom -num=1000000 $rm -rf /dev/shm/dbbench/* && TEST_TMPDIR=/dev/shm ./db_bench -benchmarks=fillrandom -num=1000000 -disable_wal=true ``` Master is at a78503bd6c80a3c4137df1962a972fe406b4d90b. ``` | | readrandom | fillrandom | | master | 15.53 MB/s | 25.97 MB/s | | PR5502 | 16.70 MB/s | 25.80 MB/s | ``` Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5502 Differential Revision: D16340894 Pulled By: riversand963 fbshipit-source-id: 51132cf792be07d1efc3ac33f5768c4ee2608bb8
5 years ago
return Iterate(&ts_assigner);
}
class MemTableInserter : public WriteBatch::Handler {
SequenceNumber sequence_;
support for concurrent adds to memtable Summary: This diff adds support for concurrent adds to the skiplist memtable implementations. Memory allocation is made thread-safe by the addition of a spinlock, with small per-core buffers to avoid contention. Concurrent memtable writes are made via an additional method and don't impose a performance overhead on the non-concurrent case, so parallelism can be selected on a per-batch basis. Write thread synchronization is an increasing bottleneck for higher levels of concurrency, so this diff adds --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield (default off). This feature causes threads joining a write batch group to spin for a short time (default 100 usec) using sched_yield, rather than going to sleep on a mutex. If the timing of the yield calls indicates that another thread has actually run during the yield then spinning is avoided. This option improves performance for concurrent situations even without parallel adds, although it has the potential to increase CPU usage (and the heuristic adaptation is not yet mature). Parallel writes are not currently compatible with inplace updates, update callbacks, or delete filtering. Enable it with --allow_concurrent_memtable_write (and --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield). Parallel memtable writes are performance neutral when there is no actual parallelism, and in my experiments (SSD server-class Linux and varying contention and key sizes for fillrandom) they are always a performance win when there is more than one thread. Statistics are updated earlier in the write path, dropping the number of DB mutex acquisitions from 2 to 1 for almost all cases. This diff was motivated and inspired by Yahoo's cLSM work. It is more conservative than cLSM: RocksDB's write batch group leader role is preserved (along with all of the existing flush and write throttling logic) and concurrent writers are blocked until all memtable insertions have completed and the sequence number has been advanced, to preserve linearizability. My test config is "db_bench -benchmarks=fillrandom -threads=$T -batch_size=1 -memtablerep=skip_list -value_size=100 --num=1000000/$T -level0_slowdown_writes_trigger=9999 -level0_stop_writes_trigger=9999 -disable_auto_compactions --max_write_buffer_number=8 -max_background_flushes=8 --disable_wal --write_buffer_size=160000000 --block_size=16384 --allow_concurrent_memtable_write" on a two-socket Xeon E5-2660 @ 2.2Ghz with lots of memory and an SSD hard drive. With 1 thread I get ~440Kops/sec. Peak performance for 1 socket (numactl -N1) is slightly more than 1Mops/sec, at 16 threads. Peak performance across both sockets happens at 30 threads, and is ~900Kops/sec, although with fewer threads there is less performance loss when the system has background work. Test Plan: 1. concurrent stress tests for InlineSkipList and DynamicBloom 2. make clean; make check 3. make clean; DISABLE_JEMALLOC=1 make valgrind_check; valgrind db_bench 4. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_TSAN=1 make all check; db_bench 5. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_ASAN=1 make all check; db_bench 6. make clean; OPT=-DROCKSDB_LITE make check 7. verify no perf regressions when disabled Reviewers: igor, sdong Reviewed By: sdong Subscribers: MarkCallaghan, IslamAbdelRahman, anthony, yhchiang, rven, sdong, guyg8, kradhakrishnan, dhruba Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D50589
9 years ago
ColumnFamilyMemTables* const cf_mems_;
FlushScheduler* const flush_scheduler_;
Refactor trimming logic for immutable memtables (#5022) Summary: MyRocks currently sets `max_write_buffer_number_to_maintain` in order to maintain enough history for transaction conflict checking. The effectiveness of this approach depends on the size of memtables. When memtables are small, it may not keep enough history; when memtables are large, this may consume too much memory. We are proposing a new way to configure memtable list history: by limiting the memory usage of immutable memtables. The new option is `max_write_buffer_size_to_maintain` and it will take precedence over the old `max_write_buffer_number_to_maintain` if they are both set to non-zero values. The new option accounts for the total memory usage of flushed immutable memtables and mutable memtable. When the total usage exceeds the limit, RocksDB may start dropping immutable memtables (which is also called trimming history), starting from the oldest one. The semantics of the old option actually works both as an upper bound and lower bound. History trimming will start if number of immutable memtables exceeds the limit, but it will never go below (limit-1) due to history trimming. In order the mimic the behavior with the new option, history trimming will stop if dropping the next immutable memtable causes the total memory usage go below the size limit. For example, assuming the size limit is set to 64MB, and there are 3 immutable memtables with sizes of 20, 30, 30. Although the total memory usage is 80MB > 64MB, dropping the oldest memtable will reduce the memory usage to 60MB < 64MB, so in this case no memtable will be dropped. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5022 Differential Revision: D14394062 Pulled By: miasantreble fbshipit-source-id: 60457a509c6af89d0993f988c9b5c2aa9e45f5c5
5 years ago
TrimHistoryScheduler* const trim_history_scheduler_;
support for concurrent adds to memtable Summary: This diff adds support for concurrent adds to the skiplist memtable implementations. Memory allocation is made thread-safe by the addition of a spinlock, with small per-core buffers to avoid contention. Concurrent memtable writes are made via an additional method and don't impose a performance overhead on the non-concurrent case, so parallelism can be selected on a per-batch basis. Write thread synchronization is an increasing bottleneck for higher levels of concurrency, so this diff adds --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield (default off). This feature causes threads joining a write batch group to spin for a short time (default 100 usec) using sched_yield, rather than going to sleep on a mutex. If the timing of the yield calls indicates that another thread has actually run during the yield then spinning is avoided. This option improves performance for concurrent situations even without parallel adds, although it has the potential to increase CPU usage (and the heuristic adaptation is not yet mature). Parallel writes are not currently compatible with inplace updates, update callbacks, or delete filtering. Enable it with --allow_concurrent_memtable_write (and --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield). Parallel memtable writes are performance neutral when there is no actual parallelism, and in my experiments (SSD server-class Linux and varying contention and key sizes for fillrandom) they are always a performance win when there is more than one thread. Statistics are updated earlier in the write path, dropping the number of DB mutex acquisitions from 2 to 1 for almost all cases. This diff was motivated and inspired by Yahoo's cLSM work. It is more conservative than cLSM: RocksDB's write batch group leader role is preserved (along with all of the existing flush and write throttling logic) and concurrent writers are blocked until all memtable insertions have completed and the sequence number has been advanced, to preserve linearizability. My test config is "db_bench -benchmarks=fillrandom -threads=$T -batch_size=1 -memtablerep=skip_list -value_size=100 --num=1000000/$T -level0_slowdown_writes_trigger=9999 -level0_stop_writes_trigger=9999 -disable_auto_compactions --max_write_buffer_number=8 -max_background_flushes=8 --disable_wal --write_buffer_size=160000000 --block_size=16384 --allow_concurrent_memtable_write" on a two-socket Xeon E5-2660 @ 2.2Ghz with lots of memory and an SSD hard drive. With 1 thread I get ~440Kops/sec. Peak performance for 1 socket (numactl -N1) is slightly more than 1Mops/sec, at 16 threads. Peak performance across both sockets happens at 30 threads, and is ~900Kops/sec, although with fewer threads there is less performance loss when the system has background work. Test Plan: 1. concurrent stress tests for InlineSkipList and DynamicBloom 2. make clean; make check 3. make clean; DISABLE_JEMALLOC=1 make valgrind_check; valgrind db_bench 4. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_TSAN=1 make all check; db_bench 5. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_ASAN=1 make all check; db_bench 6. make clean; OPT=-DROCKSDB_LITE make check 7. verify no perf regressions when disabled Reviewers: igor, sdong Reviewed By: sdong Subscribers: MarkCallaghan, IslamAbdelRahman, anthony, yhchiang, rven, sdong, guyg8, kradhakrishnan, dhruba Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D50589
9 years ago
const bool ignore_missing_column_families_;
const uint64_t recovering_log_number_;
// log number that all Memtables inserted into should reference
uint64_t log_number_ref_;
DBImpl* db_;
support for concurrent adds to memtable Summary: This diff adds support for concurrent adds to the skiplist memtable implementations. Memory allocation is made thread-safe by the addition of a spinlock, with small per-core buffers to avoid contention. Concurrent memtable writes are made via an additional method and don't impose a performance overhead on the non-concurrent case, so parallelism can be selected on a per-batch basis. Write thread synchronization is an increasing bottleneck for higher levels of concurrency, so this diff adds --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield (default off). This feature causes threads joining a write batch group to spin for a short time (default 100 usec) using sched_yield, rather than going to sleep on a mutex. If the timing of the yield calls indicates that another thread has actually run during the yield then spinning is avoided. This option improves performance for concurrent situations even without parallel adds, although it has the potential to increase CPU usage (and the heuristic adaptation is not yet mature). Parallel writes are not currently compatible with inplace updates, update callbacks, or delete filtering. Enable it with --allow_concurrent_memtable_write (and --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield). Parallel memtable writes are performance neutral when there is no actual parallelism, and in my experiments (SSD server-class Linux and varying contention and key sizes for fillrandom) they are always a performance win when there is more than one thread. Statistics are updated earlier in the write path, dropping the number of DB mutex acquisitions from 2 to 1 for almost all cases. This diff was motivated and inspired by Yahoo's cLSM work. It is more conservative than cLSM: RocksDB's write batch group leader role is preserved (along with all of the existing flush and write throttling logic) and concurrent writers are blocked until all memtable insertions have completed and the sequence number has been advanced, to preserve linearizability. My test config is "db_bench -benchmarks=fillrandom -threads=$T -batch_size=1 -memtablerep=skip_list -value_size=100 --num=1000000/$T -level0_slowdown_writes_trigger=9999 -level0_stop_writes_trigger=9999 -disable_auto_compactions --max_write_buffer_number=8 -max_background_flushes=8 --disable_wal --write_buffer_size=160000000 --block_size=16384 --allow_concurrent_memtable_write" on a two-socket Xeon E5-2660 @ 2.2Ghz with lots of memory and an SSD hard drive. With 1 thread I get ~440Kops/sec. Peak performance for 1 socket (numactl -N1) is slightly more than 1Mops/sec, at 16 threads. Peak performance across both sockets happens at 30 threads, and is ~900Kops/sec, although with fewer threads there is less performance loss when the system has background work. Test Plan: 1. concurrent stress tests for InlineSkipList and DynamicBloom 2. make clean; make check 3. make clean; DISABLE_JEMALLOC=1 make valgrind_check; valgrind db_bench 4. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_TSAN=1 make all check; db_bench 5. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_ASAN=1 make all check; db_bench 6. make clean; OPT=-DROCKSDB_LITE make check 7. verify no perf regressions when disabled Reviewers: igor, sdong Reviewed By: sdong Subscribers: MarkCallaghan, IslamAbdelRahman, anthony, yhchiang, rven, sdong, guyg8, kradhakrishnan, dhruba Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D50589
9 years ago
const bool concurrent_memtable_writes_;
bool post_info_created_;
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
const WriteBatch::ProtectionInfo* prot_info_;
size_t prot_info_idx_;
bool* has_valid_writes_;
// On some (!) platforms just default creating
// a map is too expensive in the Write() path as they
// cause memory allocations though unused.
// Make creation optional but do not incur
// std::unique_ptr additional allocation
using MemPostInfoMap = std::map<MemTable*, MemTablePostProcessInfo>;
using PostMapType = std::aligned_storage<sizeof(MemPostInfoMap)>::type;
PostMapType mem_post_info_map_;
// current recovered transaction we are rebuilding (recovery)
WriteBatch* rebuilding_trx_;
SequenceNumber rebuilding_trx_seq_;
// Increase seq number once per each write batch. Otherwise increase it once
// per key.
bool seq_per_batch_;
// Whether the memtable write will be done only after the commit
bool write_after_commit_;
// Whether memtable write can be done before prepare
bool write_before_prepare_;
// Whether this batch was unprepared or not
bool unprepared_batch_;
using DupDetector = std::aligned_storage<sizeof(DuplicateDetector)>::type;
DupDetector duplicate_detector_;
bool dup_dectector_on_;
bool hint_per_batch_;
bool hint_created_;
// Hints for this batch
using HintMap = std::unordered_map<MemTable*, void*>;
using HintMapType = std::aligned_storage<sizeof(HintMap)>::type;
HintMapType hint_;
HintMap& GetHintMap() {
assert(hint_per_batch_);
if (!hint_created_) {
new (&hint_) HintMap();
hint_created_ = true;
}
return *reinterpret_cast<HintMap*>(&hint_);
}
MemPostInfoMap& GetPostMap() {
assert(concurrent_memtable_writes_);
if(!post_info_created_) {
new (&mem_post_info_map_) MemPostInfoMap();
post_info_created_ = true;
}
return *reinterpret_cast<MemPostInfoMap*>(&mem_post_info_map_);
}
bool IsDuplicateKeySeq(uint32_t column_family_id, const Slice& key) {
assert(!write_after_commit_);
assert(rebuilding_trx_ != nullptr);
if (!dup_dectector_on_) {
new (&duplicate_detector_) DuplicateDetector(db_);
dup_dectector_on_ = true;
}
return reinterpret_cast<DuplicateDetector*>
(&duplicate_detector_)->IsDuplicateKeySeq(column_family_id, key, sequence_);
}
const ProtectionInfoKVOC64* NextProtectionInfo() {
const ProtectionInfoKVOC64* res = nullptr;
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
if (prot_info_ != nullptr) {
assert(prot_info_idx_ < prot_info_->entries_.size());
res = &prot_info_->entries_[prot_info_idx_];
++prot_info_idx_;
}
return res;
}
protected:
bool WriteBeforePrepare() const override { return write_before_prepare_; }
bool WriteAfterCommit() const override { return write_after_commit_; }
public:
support for concurrent adds to memtable Summary: This diff adds support for concurrent adds to the skiplist memtable implementations. Memory allocation is made thread-safe by the addition of a spinlock, with small per-core buffers to avoid contention. Concurrent memtable writes are made via an additional method and don't impose a performance overhead on the non-concurrent case, so parallelism can be selected on a per-batch basis. Write thread synchronization is an increasing bottleneck for higher levels of concurrency, so this diff adds --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield (default off). This feature causes threads joining a write batch group to spin for a short time (default 100 usec) using sched_yield, rather than going to sleep on a mutex. If the timing of the yield calls indicates that another thread has actually run during the yield then spinning is avoided. This option improves performance for concurrent situations even without parallel adds, although it has the potential to increase CPU usage (and the heuristic adaptation is not yet mature). Parallel writes are not currently compatible with inplace updates, update callbacks, or delete filtering. Enable it with --allow_concurrent_memtable_write (and --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield). Parallel memtable writes are performance neutral when there is no actual parallelism, and in my experiments (SSD server-class Linux and varying contention and key sizes for fillrandom) they are always a performance win when there is more than one thread. Statistics are updated earlier in the write path, dropping the number of DB mutex acquisitions from 2 to 1 for almost all cases. This diff was motivated and inspired by Yahoo's cLSM work. It is more conservative than cLSM: RocksDB's write batch group leader role is preserved (along with all of the existing flush and write throttling logic) and concurrent writers are blocked until all memtable insertions have completed and the sequence number has been advanced, to preserve linearizability. My test config is "db_bench -benchmarks=fillrandom -threads=$T -batch_size=1 -memtablerep=skip_list -value_size=100 --num=1000000/$T -level0_slowdown_writes_trigger=9999 -level0_stop_writes_trigger=9999 -disable_auto_compactions --max_write_buffer_number=8 -max_background_flushes=8 --disable_wal --write_buffer_size=160000000 --block_size=16384 --allow_concurrent_memtable_write" on a two-socket Xeon E5-2660 @ 2.2Ghz with lots of memory and an SSD hard drive. With 1 thread I get ~440Kops/sec. Peak performance for 1 socket (numactl -N1) is slightly more than 1Mops/sec, at 16 threads. Peak performance across both sockets happens at 30 threads, and is ~900Kops/sec, although with fewer threads there is less performance loss when the system has background work. Test Plan: 1. concurrent stress tests for InlineSkipList and DynamicBloom 2. make clean; make check 3. make clean; DISABLE_JEMALLOC=1 make valgrind_check; valgrind db_bench 4. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_TSAN=1 make all check; db_bench 5. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_ASAN=1 make all check; db_bench 6. make clean; OPT=-DROCKSDB_LITE make check 7. verify no perf regressions when disabled Reviewers: igor, sdong Reviewed By: sdong Subscribers: MarkCallaghan, IslamAbdelRahman, anthony, yhchiang, rven, sdong, guyg8, kradhakrishnan, dhruba Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D50589
9 years ago
// cf_mems should not be shared with concurrent inserters
MemTableInserter(SequenceNumber _sequence, ColumnFamilyMemTables* cf_mems,
FlushScheduler* flush_scheduler,
Refactor trimming logic for immutable memtables (#5022) Summary: MyRocks currently sets `max_write_buffer_number_to_maintain` in order to maintain enough history for transaction conflict checking. The effectiveness of this approach depends on the size of memtables. When memtables are small, it may not keep enough history; when memtables are large, this may consume too much memory. We are proposing a new way to configure memtable list history: by limiting the memory usage of immutable memtables. The new option is `max_write_buffer_size_to_maintain` and it will take precedence over the old `max_write_buffer_number_to_maintain` if they are both set to non-zero values. The new option accounts for the total memory usage of flushed immutable memtables and mutable memtable. When the total usage exceeds the limit, RocksDB may start dropping immutable memtables (which is also called trimming history), starting from the oldest one. The semantics of the old option actually works both as an upper bound and lower bound. History trimming will start if number of immutable memtables exceeds the limit, but it will never go below (limit-1) due to history trimming. In order the mimic the behavior with the new option, history trimming will stop if dropping the next immutable memtable causes the total memory usage go below the size limit. For example, assuming the size limit is set to 64MB, and there are 3 immutable memtables with sizes of 20, 30, 30. Although the total memory usage is 80MB > 64MB, dropping the oldest memtable will reduce the memory usage to 60MB < 64MB, so in this case no memtable will be dropped. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5022 Differential Revision: D14394062 Pulled By: miasantreble fbshipit-source-id: 60457a509c6af89d0993f988c9b5c2aa9e45f5c5
5 years ago
TrimHistoryScheduler* trim_history_scheduler,
bool ignore_missing_column_families,
uint64_t recovering_log_number, DB* db,
bool concurrent_memtable_writes,
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
const WriteBatch::ProtectionInfo* prot_info,
bool* has_valid_writes = nullptr, bool seq_per_batch = false,
bool batch_per_txn = true, bool hint_per_batch = false)
: sequence_(_sequence),
cf_mems_(cf_mems),
flush_scheduler_(flush_scheduler),
Refactor trimming logic for immutable memtables (#5022) Summary: MyRocks currently sets `max_write_buffer_number_to_maintain` in order to maintain enough history for transaction conflict checking. The effectiveness of this approach depends on the size of memtables. When memtables are small, it may not keep enough history; when memtables are large, this may consume too much memory. We are proposing a new way to configure memtable list history: by limiting the memory usage of immutable memtables. The new option is `max_write_buffer_size_to_maintain` and it will take precedence over the old `max_write_buffer_number_to_maintain` if they are both set to non-zero values. The new option accounts for the total memory usage of flushed immutable memtables and mutable memtable. When the total usage exceeds the limit, RocksDB may start dropping immutable memtables (which is also called trimming history), starting from the oldest one. The semantics of the old option actually works both as an upper bound and lower bound. History trimming will start if number of immutable memtables exceeds the limit, but it will never go below (limit-1) due to history trimming. In order the mimic the behavior with the new option, history trimming will stop if dropping the next immutable memtable causes the total memory usage go below the size limit. For example, assuming the size limit is set to 64MB, and there are 3 immutable memtables with sizes of 20, 30, 30. Although the total memory usage is 80MB > 64MB, dropping the oldest memtable will reduce the memory usage to 60MB < 64MB, so in this case no memtable will be dropped. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5022 Differential Revision: D14394062 Pulled By: miasantreble fbshipit-source-id: 60457a509c6af89d0993f988c9b5c2aa9e45f5c5
5 years ago
trim_history_scheduler_(trim_history_scheduler),
ignore_missing_column_families_(ignore_missing_column_families),
recovering_log_number_(recovering_log_number),
log_number_ref_(0),
db_(static_cast_with_check<DBImpl>(db)),
concurrent_memtable_writes_(concurrent_memtable_writes),
post_info_created_(false),
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
prot_info_(prot_info),
prot_info_idx_(0),
has_valid_writes_(has_valid_writes),
rebuilding_trx_(nullptr),
rebuilding_trx_seq_(0),
seq_per_batch_(seq_per_batch),
// Write after commit currently uses one seq per key (instead of per
// batch). So seq_per_batch being false indicates write_after_commit
// approach.
write_after_commit_(!seq_per_batch),
// WriteUnprepared can write WriteBatches per transaction, so
// batch_per_txn being false indicates write_before_prepare.
write_before_prepare_(!batch_per_txn),
unprepared_batch_(false),
duplicate_detector_(),
dup_dectector_on_(false),
hint_per_batch_(hint_per_batch),
hint_created_(false) {
assert(cf_mems_);
}
~MemTableInserter() override {
if (dup_dectector_on_) {
reinterpret_cast<DuplicateDetector*>
(&duplicate_detector_)->~DuplicateDetector();
}
if (post_info_created_) {
reinterpret_cast<MemPostInfoMap*>
(&mem_post_info_map_)->~MemPostInfoMap();
}
if (hint_created_) {
for (auto iter : GetHintMap()) {
delete[] reinterpret_cast<char*>(iter.second);
}
reinterpret_cast<HintMap*>(&hint_)->~HintMap();
}
delete rebuilding_trx_;
}
MemTableInserter(const MemTableInserter&) = delete;
MemTableInserter& operator=(const MemTableInserter&) = delete;
// The batch seq is regularly restarted; In normal mode it is set when
// MemTableInserter is constructed in the write thread and in recovery mode it
// is set when a batch, which is tagged with seq, is read from the WAL.
// Within a sequenced batch, which could be a merge of multiple batches, we
// have two policies to advance the seq: i) seq_per_key (default) and ii)
// seq_per_batch. To implement the latter we need to mark the boundary between
// the individual batches. The approach is this: 1) Use the terminating
// markers to indicate the boundary (kTypeEndPrepareXID, kTypeCommitXID,
// kTypeRollbackXID) 2) Terminate a batch with kTypeNoop in the absence of a
// natural boundary marker.
void MaybeAdvanceSeq(bool batch_boundry = false) {
if (batch_boundry == seq_per_batch_) {
sequence_++;
}
}
void set_log_number_ref(uint64_t log) { log_number_ref_ = log; }
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
void set_prot_info(const WriteBatch::ProtectionInfo* prot_info) {
prot_info_ = prot_info;
prot_info_idx_ = 0;
}
SequenceNumber sequence() const { return sequence_; }
void PostProcess() {
assert(concurrent_memtable_writes_);
// If post info was not created there is nothing
// to process and no need to create on demand
if(post_info_created_) {
for (auto& pair : GetPostMap()) {
pair.first->BatchPostProcess(pair.second);
}
}
}
bool SeekToColumnFamily(uint32_t column_family_id, Status* s) {
support for concurrent adds to memtable Summary: This diff adds support for concurrent adds to the skiplist memtable implementations. Memory allocation is made thread-safe by the addition of a spinlock, with small per-core buffers to avoid contention. Concurrent memtable writes are made via an additional method and don't impose a performance overhead on the non-concurrent case, so parallelism can be selected on a per-batch basis. Write thread synchronization is an increasing bottleneck for higher levels of concurrency, so this diff adds --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield (default off). This feature causes threads joining a write batch group to spin for a short time (default 100 usec) using sched_yield, rather than going to sleep on a mutex. If the timing of the yield calls indicates that another thread has actually run during the yield then spinning is avoided. This option improves performance for concurrent situations even without parallel adds, although it has the potential to increase CPU usage (and the heuristic adaptation is not yet mature). Parallel writes are not currently compatible with inplace updates, update callbacks, or delete filtering. Enable it with --allow_concurrent_memtable_write (and --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield). Parallel memtable writes are performance neutral when there is no actual parallelism, and in my experiments (SSD server-class Linux and varying contention and key sizes for fillrandom) they are always a performance win when there is more than one thread. Statistics are updated earlier in the write path, dropping the number of DB mutex acquisitions from 2 to 1 for almost all cases. This diff was motivated and inspired by Yahoo's cLSM work. It is more conservative than cLSM: RocksDB's write batch group leader role is preserved (along with all of the existing flush and write throttling logic) and concurrent writers are blocked until all memtable insertions have completed and the sequence number has been advanced, to preserve linearizability. My test config is "db_bench -benchmarks=fillrandom -threads=$T -batch_size=1 -memtablerep=skip_list -value_size=100 --num=1000000/$T -level0_slowdown_writes_trigger=9999 -level0_stop_writes_trigger=9999 -disable_auto_compactions --max_write_buffer_number=8 -max_background_flushes=8 --disable_wal --write_buffer_size=160000000 --block_size=16384 --allow_concurrent_memtable_write" on a two-socket Xeon E5-2660 @ 2.2Ghz with lots of memory and an SSD hard drive. With 1 thread I get ~440Kops/sec. Peak performance for 1 socket (numactl -N1) is slightly more than 1Mops/sec, at 16 threads. Peak performance across both sockets happens at 30 threads, and is ~900Kops/sec, although with fewer threads there is less performance loss when the system has background work. Test Plan: 1. concurrent stress tests for InlineSkipList and DynamicBloom 2. make clean; make check 3. make clean; DISABLE_JEMALLOC=1 make valgrind_check; valgrind db_bench 4. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_TSAN=1 make all check; db_bench 5. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_ASAN=1 make all check; db_bench 6. make clean; OPT=-DROCKSDB_LITE make check 7. verify no perf regressions when disabled Reviewers: igor, sdong Reviewed By: sdong Subscribers: MarkCallaghan, IslamAbdelRahman, anthony, yhchiang, rven, sdong, guyg8, kradhakrishnan, dhruba Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D50589
9 years ago
// If we are in a concurrent mode, it is the caller's responsibility
// to clone the original ColumnFamilyMemTables so that each thread
// has its own instance. Otherwise, it must be guaranteed that there
// is no concurrent access
bool found = cf_mems_->Seek(column_family_id);
if (!found) {
if (ignore_missing_column_families_) {
*s = Status::OK();
} else {
*s = Status::InvalidArgument(
"Invalid column family specified in write batch");
}
return false;
}
if (recovering_log_number_ != 0 &&
recovering_log_number_ < cf_mems_->GetLogNumber()) {
// This is true only in recovery environment (recovering_log_number_ is
// always 0 in
// non-recovery, regular write code-path)
// * If recovering_log_number_ < cf_mems_->GetLogNumber(), this means that
// column
// family already contains updates from this log. We can't apply updates
// twice because of update-in-place or merge workloads -- ignore the
// update
*s = Status::OK();
return false;
}
if (has_valid_writes_ != nullptr) {
*has_valid_writes_ = true;
}
if (log_number_ref_ > 0) {
cf_mems_->GetMemTable()->RefLogContainingPrepSection(log_number_ref_);
}
return true;
}
Status PutCFImpl(uint32_t column_family_id, const Slice& key,
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
const Slice& value, ValueType value_type,
const ProtectionInfoKVOS64* kv_prot_info) {
// optimize for non-recovery mode
if (UNLIKELY(write_after_commit_ && rebuilding_trx_ != nullptr)) {
// TODO(ajkr): propagate `ProtectionInfoKVOS64`.
return WriteBatchInternal::Put(rebuilding_trx_, column_family_id, key,
value);
// else insert the values to the memtable right away
}
Status ret_status;
if (UNLIKELY(!SeekToColumnFamily(column_family_id, &ret_status))) {
if (ret_status.ok() && rebuilding_trx_ != nullptr) {
assert(!write_after_commit_);
// The CF is probably flushed and hence no need for insert but we still
// need to keep track of the keys for upcoming rollback/commit.
// TODO(ajkr): propagate `ProtectionInfoKVOS64`.
ret_status = WriteBatchInternal::Put(rebuilding_trx_, column_family_id,
key, value);
if (ret_status.ok()) {
MaybeAdvanceSeq(IsDuplicateKeySeq(column_family_id, key));
}
} else if (ret_status.ok()) {
MaybeAdvanceSeq(false /* batch_boundary */);
}
return ret_status;
}
assert(ret_status.ok());
MemTable* mem = cf_mems_->GetMemTable();
auto* moptions = mem->GetImmutableMemTableOptions();
// inplace_update_support is inconsistent with snapshots, and therefore with
// any kind of transactions including the ones that use seq_per_batch
assert(!seq_per_batch_ || !moptions->inplace_update_support);
if (!moptions->inplace_update_support) {
ret_status =
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
mem->Add(sequence_, value_type, key, value, kv_prot_info,
concurrent_memtable_writes_, get_post_process_info(mem),
hint_per_batch_ ? &GetHintMap()[mem] : nullptr);
} else if (moptions->inplace_callback == nullptr) {
support for concurrent adds to memtable Summary: This diff adds support for concurrent adds to the skiplist memtable implementations. Memory allocation is made thread-safe by the addition of a spinlock, with small per-core buffers to avoid contention. Concurrent memtable writes are made via an additional method and don't impose a performance overhead on the non-concurrent case, so parallelism can be selected on a per-batch basis. Write thread synchronization is an increasing bottleneck for higher levels of concurrency, so this diff adds --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield (default off). This feature causes threads joining a write batch group to spin for a short time (default 100 usec) using sched_yield, rather than going to sleep on a mutex. If the timing of the yield calls indicates that another thread has actually run during the yield then spinning is avoided. This option improves performance for concurrent situations even without parallel adds, although it has the potential to increase CPU usage (and the heuristic adaptation is not yet mature). Parallel writes are not currently compatible with inplace updates, update callbacks, or delete filtering. Enable it with --allow_concurrent_memtable_write (and --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield). Parallel memtable writes are performance neutral when there is no actual parallelism, and in my experiments (SSD server-class Linux and varying contention and key sizes for fillrandom) they are always a performance win when there is more than one thread. Statistics are updated earlier in the write path, dropping the number of DB mutex acquisitions from 2 to 1 for almost all cases. This diff was motivated and inspired by Yahoo's cLSM work. It is more conservative than cLSM: RocksDB's write batch group leader role is preserved (along with all of the existing flush and write throttling logic) and concurrent writers are blocked until all memtable insertions have completed and the sequence number has been advanced, to preserve linearizability. My test config is "db_bench -benchmarks=fillrandom -threads=$T -batch_size=1 -memtablerep=skip_list -value_size=100 --num=1000000/$T -level0_slowdown_writes_trigger=9999 -level0_stop_writes_trigger=9999 -disable_auto_compactions --max_write_buffer_number=8 -max_background_flushes=8 --disable_wal --write_buffer_size=160000000 --block_size=16384 --allow_concurrent_memtable_write" on a two-socket Xeon E5-2660 @ 2.2Ghz with lots of memory and an SSD hard drive. With 1 thread I get ~440Kops/sec. Peak performance for 1 socket (numactl -N1) is slightly more than 1Mops/sec, at 16 threads. Peak performance across both sockets happens at 30 threads, and is ~900Kops/sec, although with fewer threads there is less performance loss when the system has background work. Test Plan: 1. concurrent stress tests for InlineSkipList and DynamicBloom 2. make clean; make check 3. make clean; DISABLE_JEMALLOC=1 make valgrind_check; valgrind db_bench 4. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_TSAN=1 make all check; db_bench 5. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_ASAN=1 make all check; db_bench 6. make clean; OPT=-DROCKSDB_LITE make check 7. verify no perf regressions when disabled Reviewers: igor, sdong Reviewed By: sdong Subscribers: MarkCallaghan, IslamAbdelRahman, anthony, yhchiang, rven, sdong, guyg8, kradhakrishnan, dhruba Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D50589
9 years ago
assert(!concurrent_memtable_writes_);
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
ret_status = mem->Update(sequence_, key, value, kv_prot_info);
} else {
support for concurrent adds to memtable Summary: This diff adds support for concurrent adds to the skiplist memtable implementations. Memory allocation is made thread-safe by the addition of a spinlock, with small per-core buffers to avoid contention. Concurrent memtable writes are made via an additional method and don't impose a performance overhead on the non-concurrent case, so parallelism can be selected on a per-batch basis. Write thread synchronization is an increasing bottleneck for higher levels of concurrency, so this diff adds --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield (default off). This feature causes threads joining a write batch group to spin for a short time (default 100 usec) using sched_yield, rather than going to sleep on a mutex. If the timing of the yield calls indicates that another thread has actually run during the yield then spinning is avoided. This option improves performance for concurrent situations even without parallel adds, although it has the potential to increase CPU usage (and the heuristic adaptation is not yet mature). Parallel writes are not currently compatible with inplace updates, update callbacks, or delete filtering. Enable it with --allow_concurrent_memtable_write (and --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield). Parallel memtable writes are performance neutral when there is no actual parallelism, and in my experiments (SSD server-class Linux and varying contention and key sizes for fillrandom) they are always a performance win when there is more than one thread. Statistics are updated earlier in the write path, dropping the number of DB mutex acquisitions from 2 to 1 for almost all cases. This diff was motivated and inspired by Yahoo's cLSM work. It is more conservative than cLSM: RocksDB's write batch group leader role is preserved (along with all of the existing flush and write throttling logic) and concurrent writers are blocked until all memtable insertions have completed and the sequence number has been advanced, to preserve linearizability. My test config is "db_bench -benchmarks=fillrandom -threads=$T -batch_size=1 -memtablerep=skip_list -value_size=100 --num=1000000/$T -level0_slowdown_writes_trigger=9999 -level0_stop_writes_trigger=9999 -disable_auto_compactions --max_write_buffer_number=8 -max_background_flushes=8 --disable_wal --write_buffer_size=160000000 --block_size=16384 --allow_concurrent_memtable_write" on a two-socket Xeon E5-2660 @ 2.2Ghz with lots of memory and an SSD hard drive. With 1 thread I get ~440Kops/sec. Peak performance for 1 socket (numactl -N1) is slightly more than 1Mops/sec, at 16 threads. Peak performance across both sockets happens at 30 threads, and is ~900Kops/sec, although with fewer threads there is less performance loss when the system has background work. Test Plan: 1. concurrent stress tests for InlineSkipList and DynamicBloom 2. make clean; make check 3. make clean; DISABLE_JEMALLOC=1 make valgrind_check; valgrind db_bench 4. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_TSAN=1 make all check; db_bench 5. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_ASAN=1 make all check; db_bench 6. make clean; OPT=-DROCKSDB_LITE make check 7. verify no perf regressions when disabled Reviewers: igor, sdong Reviewed By: sdong Subscribers: MarkCallaghan, IslamAbdelRahman, anthony, yhchiang, rven, sdong, guyg8, kradhakrishnan, dhruba Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D50589
9 years ago
assert(!concurrent_memtable_writes_);
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
ret_status = mem->UpdateCallback(sequence_, key, value, kv_prot_info);
if (ret_status.IsNotFound()) {
// key not found in memtable. Do sst get, update, add
SnapshotImpl read_from_snapshot;
read_from_snapshot.number_ = sequence_;
ReadOptions ropts;
// it's going to be overwritten for sure, so no point caching data block
// containing the old version
ropts.fill_cache = false;
ropts.snapshot = &read_from_snapshot;
std::string prev_value;
std::string merged_value;
auto cf_handle = cf_mems_->GetColumnFamilyHandle();
Status get_status = Status::NotSupported();
if (db_ != nullptr && recovering_log_number_ == 0) {
if (cf_handle == nullptr) {
cf_handle = db_->DefaultColumnFamily();
}
get_status = db_->Get(ropts, cf_handle, key, &prev_value);
}
// Intentionally overwrites the `NotFound` in `ret_status`.
if (!get_status.ok() && !get_status.IsNotFound()) {
ret_status = get_status;
} else {
ret_status = Status::OK();
}
if (ret_status.ok()) {
UpdateStatus update_status;
char* prev_buffer = const_cast<char*>(prev_value.c_str());
uint32_t prev_size = static_cast<uint32_t>(prev_value.size());
if (get_status.ok()) {
update_status = moptions->inplace_callback(prev_buffer, &prev_size,
value, &merged_value);
} else {
update_status = moptions->inplace_callback(
nullptr /* existing_value */, nullptr /* existing_value_size */,
value, &merged_value);
}
if (update_status == UpdateStatus::UPDATED_INPLACE) {
assert(get_status.ok());
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
if (kv_prot_info != nullptr) {
ProtectionInfoKVOS64 updated_kv_prot_info(*kv_prot_info);
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
updated_kv_prot_info.UpdateV(value,
Slice(prev_buffer, prev_size));
// prev_value is updated in-place with final value.
ret_status = mem->Add(sequence_, value_type, key,
Slice(prev_buffer, prev_size),
&updated_kv_prot_info);
} else {
ret_status = mem->Add(sequence_, value_type, key,
Slice(prev_buffer, prev_size),
nullptr /* kv_prot_info */);
}
if (ret_status.ok()) {
RecordTick(moptions->statistics, NUMBER_KEYS_WRITTEN);
}
} else if (update_status == UpdateStatus::UPDATED) {
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
if (kv_prot_info != nullptr) {
ProtectionInfoKVOS64 updated_kv_prot_info(*kv_prot_info);
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
updated_kv_prot_info.UpdateV(value, merged_value);
// merged_value contains the final value.
ret_status = mem->Add(sequence_, value_type, key,
Slice(merged_value), &updated_kv_prot_info);
} else {
// merged_value contains the final value.
ret_status =
mem->Add(sequence_, value_type, key, Slice(merged_value),
nullptr /* kv_prot_info */);
}
if (ret_status.ok()) {
RecordTick(moptions->statistics, NUMBER_KEYS_WRITTEN);
}
}
}
}
}
if (UNLIKELY(ret_status.IsTryAgain())) {
assert(seq_per_batch_);
const bool kBatchBoundary = true;
MaybeAdvanceSeq(kBatchBoundary);
} else if (ret_status.ok()) {
MaybeAdvanceSeq();
CheckMemtableFull();
}
// optimize for non-recovery mode
// If `ret_status` is `TryAgain` then the next (successful) try will add
// the key to the rebuilding transaction object. If `ret_status` is
// another non-OK `Status`, then the `rebuilding_trx_` will be thrown
// away. So we only need to add to it when `ret_status.ok()`.
if (UNLIKELY(ret_status.ok() && rebuilding_trx_ != nullptr)) {
assert(!write_after_commit_);
// TODO(ajkr): propagate `ProtectionInfoKVOS64`.
ret_status = WriteBatchInternal::Put(rebuilding_trx_, column_family_id,
key, value);
}
return ret_status;
}
Status PutCF(uint32_t column_family_id, const Slice& key,
const Slice& value) override {
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
const auto* kv_prot_info = NextProtectionInfo();
if (kv_prot_info != nullptr) {
// Memtable needs seqno, doesn't need CF ID
auto mem_kv_prot_info =
kv_prot_info->StripC(column_family_id).ProtectS(sequence_);
return PutCFImpl(column_family_id, key, value, kTypeValue,
&mem_kv_prot_info);
}
return PutCFImpl(column_family_id, key, value, kTypeValue,
nullptr /* kv_prot_info */);
}
Status DeleteImpl(uint32_t /*column_family_id*/, const Slice& key,
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
const Slice& value, ValueType delete_type,
const ProtectionInfoKVOS64* kv_prot_info) {
Status ret_status;
Support for SingleDelete() Summary: This patch fixes #7460559. It introduces SingleDelete as a new database operation. This operation can be used to delete keys that were never overwritten (no put following another put of the same key). If an overwritten key is single deleted the behavior is undefined. Single deletion of a non-existent key has no effect but multiple consecutive single deletions are not allowed (see limitations). In contrast to the conventional Delete() operation, the deletion entry is removed along with the value when the two are lined up in a compaction. Note: The semantics are similar to @igor's prototype that allowed to have this behavior on the granularity of a column family ( https://reviews.facebook.net/D42093 ). This new patch, however, is more aggressive when it comes to removing tombstones: It removes the SingleDelete together with the value whenever there is no snapshot between them while the older patch only did this when the sequence number of the deletion was older than the earliest snapshot. Most of the complex additions are in the Compaction Iterator, all other changes should be relatively straightforward. The patch also includes basic support for single deletions in db_stress and db_bench. Limitations: - Not compatible with cuckoo hash tables - Single deletions cannot be used in combination with merges and normal deletions on the same key (other keys are not affected by this) - Consecutive single deletions are currently not allowed (and older version of this patch supported this so it could be resurrected if needed) Test Plan: make all check Reviewers: yhchiang, sdong, rven, anthony, yoshinorim, igor Reviewed By: igor Subscribers: maykov, dhruba, leveldb Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D43179
9 years ago
MemTable* mem = cf_mems_->GetMemTable();
ret_status =
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
mem->Add(sequence_, delete_type, key, value, kv_prot_info,
concurrent_memtable_writes_, get_post_process_info(mem),
hint_per_batch_ ? &GetHintMap()[mem] : nullptr);
if (UNLIKELY(ret_status.IsTryAgain())) {
assert(seq_per_batch_);
const bool kBatchBoundary = true;
MaybeAdvanceSeq(kBatchBoundary);
} else if (ret_status.ok()) {
MaybeAdvanceSeq();
CheckMemtableFull();
}
return ret_status;
Support for SingleDelete() Summary: This patch fixes #7460559. It introduces SingleDelete as a new database operation. This operation can be used to delete keys that were never overwritten (no put following another put of the same key). If an overwritten key is single deleted the behavior is undefined. Single deletion of a non-existent key has no effect but multiple consecutive single deletions are not allowed (see limitations). In contrast to the conventional Delete() operation, the deletion entry is removed along with the value when the two are lined up in a compaction. Note: The semantics are similar to @igor's prototype that allowed to have this behavior on the granularity of a column family ( https://reviews.facebook.net/D42093 ). This new patch, however, is more aggressive when it comes to removing tombstones: It removes the SingleDelete together with the value whenever there is no snapshot between them while the older patch only did this when the sequence number of the deletion was older than the earliest snapshot. Most of the complex additions are in the Compaction Iterator, all other changes should be relatively straightforward. The patch also includes basic support for single deletions in db_stress and db_bench. Limitations: - Not compatible with cuckoo hash tables - Single deletions cannot be used in combination with merges and normal deletions on the same key (other keys are not affected by this) - Consecutive single deletions are currently not allowed (and older version of this patch supported this so it could be resurrected if needed) Test Plan: make all check Reviewers: yhchiang, sdong, rven, anthony, yoshinorim, igor Reviewed By: igor Subscribers: maykov, dhruba, leveldb Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D43179
9 years ago
}
Status DeleteCF(uint32_t column_family_id, const Slice& key) override {
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
const auto* kv_prot_info = NextProtectionInfo();
// optimize for non-recovery mode
if (UNLIKELY(write_after_commit_ && rebuilding_trx_ != nullptr)) {
// TODO(ajkr): propagate `ProtectionInfoKVOS64`.
return WriteBatchInternal::Delete(rebuilding_trx_, column_family_id, key);
// else insert the values to the memtable right away
}
Status ret_status;
if (UNLIKELY(!SeekToColumnFamily(column_family_id, &ret_status))) {
if (ret_status.ok() && rebuilding_trx_ != nullptr) {
assert(!write_after_commit_);
// The CF is probably flushed and hence no need for insert but we still
// need to keep track of the keys for upcoming rollback/commit.
// TODO(ajkr): propagate `ProtectionInfoKVOS64`.
ret_status =
WriteBatchInternal::Delete(rebuilding_trx_, column_family_id, key);
if (ret_status.ok()) {
MaybeAdvanceSeq(IsDuplicateKeySeq(column_family_id, key));
}
} else if (ret_status.ok()) {
MaybeAdvanceSeq(false /* batch_boundary */);
}
return ret_status;
}
ColumnFamilyData* cfd = cf_mems_->current();
assert(!cfd || cfd->user_comparator());
const size_t ts_sz = (cfd && cfd->user_comparator())
? cfd->user_comparator()->timestamp_size()
: 0;
const ValueType delete_type =
(0 == ts_sz) ? kTypeDeletion : kTypeDeletionWithTimestamp;
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
if (kv_prot_info != nullptr) {
auto mem_kv_prot_info =
kv_prot_info->StripC(column_family_id).ProtectS(sequence_);
mem_kv_prot_info.UpdateO(kTypeDeletion, delete_type);
ret_status = DeleteImpl(column_family_id, key, Slice(), delete_type,
&mem_kv_prot_info);
} else {
ret_status = DeleteImpl(column_family_id, key, Slice(), delete_type,
nullptr /* kv_prot_info */);
}
// optimize for non-recovery mode
// If `ret_status` is `TryAgain` then the next (successful) try will add
// the key to the rebuilding transaction object. If `ret_status` is
// another non-OK `Status`, then the `rebuilding_trx_` will be thrown
// away. So we only need to add to it when `ret_status.ok()`.
if (UNLIKELY(ret_status.ok() && rebuilding_trx_ != nullptr)) {
assert(!write_after_commit_);
// TODO(ajkr): propagate `ProtectionInfoKVOS64`.
ret_status =
WriteBatchInternal::Delete(rebuilding_trx_, column_family_id, key);
}
return ret_status;
}
Status SingleDeleteCF(uint32_t column_family_id, const Slice& key) override {
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
const auto* kv_prot_info = NextProtectionInfo();
// optimize for non-recovery mode
if (UNLIKELY(write_after_commit_ && rebuilding_trx_ != nullptr)) {
// TODO(ajkr): propagate `ProtectionInfoKVOS64`.
return WriteBatchInternal::SingleDelete(rebuilding_trx_, column_family_id,
key);
// else insert the values to the memtable right away
}
Status ret_status;
if (UNLIKELY(!SeekToColumnFamily(column_family_id, &ret_status))) {
if (ret_status.ok() && rebuilding_trx_ != nullptr) {
assert(!write_after_commit_);
// The CF is probably flushed and hence no need for insert but we still
// need to keep track of the keys for upcoming rollback/commit.
// TODO(ajkr): propagate `ProtectionInfoKVOS64`.
ret_status = WriteBatchInternal::SingleDelete(rebuilding_trx_,
column_family_id, key);
if (ret_status.ok()) {
MaybeAdvanceSeq(IsDuplicateKeySeq(column_family_id, key));
}
} else if (ret_status.ok()) {
MaybeAdvanceSeq(false /* batch_boundary */);
}
return ret_status;
}
assert(ret_status.ok());
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
if (kv_prot_info != nullptr) {
auto mem_kv_prot_info =
kv_prot_info->StripC(column_family_id).ProtectS(sequence_);
ret_status = DeleteImpl(column_family_id, key, Slice(),
kTypeSingleDeletion, &mem_kv_prot_info);
} else {
ret_status = DeleteImpl(column_family_id, key, Slice(),
kTypeSingleDeletion, nullptr /* kv_prot_info */);
}
// optimize for non-recovery mode
// If `ret_status` is `TryAgain` then the next (successful) try will add
// the key to the rebuilding transaction object. If `ret_status` is
// another non-OK `Status`, then the `rebuilding_trx_` will be thrown
// away. So we only need to add to it when `ret_status.ok()`.
if (UNLIKELY(ret_status.ok() && rebuilding_trx_ != nullptr)) {
assert(!write_after_commit_);
// TODO(ajkr): propagate `ProtectionInfoKVOS64`.
ret_status = WriteBatchInternal::SingleDelete(rebuilding_trx_,
column_family_id, key);
}
return ret_status;
}
Status DeleteRangeCF(uint32_t column_family_id, const Slice& begin_key,
const Slice& end_key) override {
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
const auto* kv_prot_info = NextProtectionInfo();
// optimize for non-recovery mode
if (UNLIKELY(write_after_commit_ && rebuilding_trx_ != nullptr)) {
// TODO(ajkr): propagate `ProtectionInfoKVOS64`.
return WriteBatchInternal::DeleteRange(rebuilding_trx_, column_family_id,
begin_key, end_key);
// else insert the values to the memtable right away
}
Status ret_status;
if (UNLIKELY(!SeekToColumnFamily(column_family_id, &ret_status))) {
if (ret_status.ok() && rebuilding_trx_ != nullptr) {
assert(!write_after_commit_);
// The CF is probably flushed and hence no need for insert but we still
// need to keep track of the keys for upcoming rollback/commit.
// TODO(ajkr): propagate `ProtectionInfoKVOS64`.
ret_status = WriteBatchInternal::DeleteRange(
rebuilding_trx_, column_family_id, begin_key, end_key);
if (ret_status.ok()) {
MaybeAdvanceSeq(IsDuplicateKeySeq(column_family_id, begin_key));
}
} else if (ret_status.ok()) {
MaybeAdvanceSeq(false /* batch_boundary */);
}
return ret_status;
}
assert(ret_status.ok());
if (db_ != nullptr) {
auto cf_handle = cf_mems_->GetColumnFamilyHandle();
if (cf_handle == nullptr) {
cf_handle = db_->DefaultColumnFamily();
}
auto* cfd =
static_cast_with_check<ColumnFamilyHandleImpl>(cf_handle)->cfd();
if (!cfd->is_delete_range_supported()) {
// TODO(ajkr): refactor `SeekToColumnFamily()` so it returns a `Status`.
ret_status.PermitUncheckedError();
return Status::NotSupported(
std::string("DeleteRange not supported for table type ") +
cfd->ioptions()->table_factory->Name() + " in CF " +
cfd->GetName());
}
int cmp = cfd->user_comparator()->Compare(begin_key, end_key);
if (cmp > 0) {
// TODO(ajkr): refactor `SeekToColumnFamily()` so it returns a `Status`.
ret_status.PermitUncheckedError();
// It's an empty range where endpoints appear mistaken. Don't bother
// applying it to the DB, and return an error to the user.
return Status::InvalidArgument("end key comes before start key");
} else if (cmp == 0) {
// TODO(ajkr): refactor `SeekToColumnFamily()` so it returns a `Status`.
ret_status.PermitUncheckedError();
// It's an empty range. Don't bother applying it to the DB.
return Status::OK();
}
}
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
if (kv_prot_info != nullptr) {
auto mem_kv_prot_info =
kv_prot_info->StripC(column_family_id).ProtectS(sequence_);
ret_status = DeleteImpl(column_family_id, begin_key, end_key,
kTypeRangeDeletion, &mem_kv_prot_info);
} else {
ret_status = DeleteImpl(column_family_id, begin_key, end_key,
kTypeRangeDeletion, nullptr /* kv_prot_info */);
}
// optimize for non-recovery mode
// If `ret_status` is `TryAgain` then the next (successful) try will add
// the key to the rebuilding transaction object. If `ret_status` is
// another non-OK `Status`, then the `rebuilding_trx_` will be thrown
// away. So we only need to add to it when `ret_status.ok()`.
if (UNLIKELY(!ret_status.IsTryAgain() && rebuilding_trx_ != nullptr)) {
assert(!write_after_commit_);
// TODO(ajkr): propagate `ProtectionInfoKVOS64`.
ret_status = WriteBatchInternal::DeleteRange(
rebuilding_trx_, column_family_id, begin_key, end_key);
}
return ret_status;
Support for SingleDelete() Summary: This patch fixes #7460559. It introduces SingleDelete as a new database operation. This operation can be used to delete keys that were never overwritten (no put following another put of the same key). If an overwritten key is single deleted the behavior is undefined. Single deletion of a non-existent key has no effect but multiple consecutive single deletions are not allowed (see limitations). In contrast to the conventional Delete() operation, the deletion entry is removed along with the value when the two are lined up in a compaction. Note: The semantics are similar to @igor's prototype that allowed to have this behavior on the granularity of a column family ( https://reviews.facebook.net/D42093 ). This new patch, however, is more aggressive when it comes to removing tombstones: It removes the SingleDelete together with the value whenever there is no snapshot between them while the older patch only did this when the sequence number of the deletion was older than the earliest snapshot. Most of the complex additions are in the Compaction Iterator, all other changes should be relatively straightforward. The patch also includes basic support for single deletions in db_stress and db_bench. Limitations: - Not compatible with cuckoo hash tables - Single deletions cannot be used in combination with merges and normal deletions on the same key (other keys are not affected by this) - Consecutive single deletions are currently not allowed (and older version of this patch supported this so it could be resurrected if needed) Test Plan: make all check Reviewers: yhchiang, sdong, rven, anthony, yoshinorim, igor Reviewed By: igor Subscribers: maykov, dhruba, leveldb Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D43179
9 years ago
}
Status MergeCF(uint32_t column_family_id, const Slice& key,
const Slice& value) override {
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
const auto* kv_prot_info = NextProtectionInfo();
// optimize for non-recovery mode
if (UNLIKELY(write_after_commit_ && rebuilding_trx_ != nullptr)) {
// TODO(ajkr): propagate `ProtectionInfoKVOS64`.
return WriteBatchInternal::Merge(rebuilding_trx_, column_family_id, key,
value);
// else insert the values to the memtable right away
}
Status ret_status;
if (UNLIKELY(!SeekToColumnFamily(column_family_id, &ret_status))) {
if (ret_status.ok() && rebuilding_trx_ != nullptr) {
assert(!write_after_commit_);
// The CF is probably flushed and hence no need for insert but we still
// need to keep track of the keys for upcoming rollback/commit.
// TODO(ajkr): propagate `ProtectionInfoKVOS64`.
ret_status = WriteBatchInternal::Merge(rebuilding_trx_,
column_family_id, key, value);
if (ret_status.ok()) {
MaybeAdvanceSeq(IsDuplicateKeySeq(column_family_id, key));
}
} else if (ret_status.ok()) {
MaybeAdvanceSeq(false /* batch_boundary */);
}
return ret_status;
}
assert(ret_status.ok());
MemTable* mem = cf_mems_->GetMemTable();
auto* moptions = mem->GetImmutableMemTableOptions();
if (moptions->merge_operator == nullptr) {
return Status::InvalidArgument(
"Merge requires `ColumnFamilyOptions::merge_operator != nullptr`");
}
bool perform_merge = false;
Unordered Writes (#5218) Summary: Performing unordered writes in rocksdb when unordered_write option is set to true. When enabled the writes to memtable are done without joining any write thread. This offers much higher write throughput since the upcoming writes would not have to wait for the slowest memtable write to finish. The tradeoff is that the writes visible to a snapshot might change over time. If the application cannot tolerate that, it should implement its own mechanisms to work around that. Using TransactionDB with WRITE_PREPARED write policy is one way to achieve that. Doing so increases the max throughput by 2.2x without however compromising the snapshot guarantees. The patch is prepared based on an original by siying Existing unit tests are extended to include unordered_write option. Benchmark Results: ``` TEST_TMPDIR=/dev/shm/ ./db_bench_unordered --benchmarks=fillrandom --threads=32 --num=10000000 -max_write_buffer_number=16 --max_background_jobs=64 --batch_size=8 --writes=3000000 -level0_file_num_compaction_trigger=99999 --level0_slowdown_writes_trigger=99999 --level0_stop_writes_trigger=99999 -enable_pipelined_write=false -disable_auto_compactions --unordered_write=1 ``` With WAL - Vanilla RocksDB: 78.6 MB/s - WRITER_PREPARED with unordered_write: 177.8 MB/s (2.2x) - unordered_write: 368.9 MB/s (4.7x with relaxed snapshot guarantees) Without WAL - Vanilla RocksDB: 111.3 MB/s - WRITER_PREPARED with unordered_write: 259.3 MB/s MB/s (2.3x) - unordered_write: 645.6 MB/s (5.8x with relaxed snapshot guarantees) - WRITER_PREPARED with unordered_write disable concurrency control: 185.3 MB/s MB/s (2.35x) Limitations: - The feature is not yet extended to `max_successive_merges` > 0. The feature is also incompatible with `enable_pipelined_write` = true as well as with `allow_concurrent_memtable_write` = false. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5218 Differential Revision: D15219029 Pulled By: maysamyabandeh fbshipit-source-id: 38f2abc4af8780148c6128acdba2b3227bc81759
6 years ago
assert(!concurrent_memtable_writes_ ||
moptions->max_successive_merges == 0);
// If we pass DB through and options.max_successive_merges is hit
// during recovery, Get() will be issued which will try to acquire
// DB mutex and cause deadlock, as DB mutex is already held.
// So we disable merge in recovery
if (moptions->max_successive_merges > 0 && db_ != nullptr &&
recovering_log_number_ == 0) {
Unordered Writes (#5218) Summary: Performing unordered writes in rocksdb when unordered_write option is set to true. When enabled the writes to memtable are done without joining any write thread. This offers much higher write throughput since the upcoming writes would not have to wait for the slowest memtable write to finish. The tradeoff is that the writes visible to a snapshot might change over time. If the application cannot tolerate that, it should implement its own mechanisms to work around that. Using TransactionDB with WRITE_PREPARED write policy is one way to achieve that. Doing so increases the max throughput by 2.2x without however compromising the snapshot guarantees. The patch is prepared based on an original by siying Existing unit tests are extended to include unordered_write option. Benchmark Results: ``` TEST_TMPDIR=/dev/shm/ ./db_bench_unordered --benchmarks=fillrandom --threads=32 --num=10000000 -max_write_buffer_number=16 --max_background_jobs=64 --batch_size=8 --writes=3000000 -level0_file_num_compaction_trigger=99999 --level0_slowdown_writes_trigger=99999 --level0_stop_writes_trigger=99999 -enable_pipelined_write=false -disable_auto_compactions --unordered_write=1 ``` With WAL - Vanilla RocksDB: 78.6 MB/s - WRITER_PREPARED with unordered_write: 177.8 MB/s (2.2x) - unordered_write: 368.9 MB/s (4.7x with relaxed snapshot guarantees) Without WAL - Vanilla RocksDB: 111.3 MB/s - WRITER_PREPARED with unordered_write: 259.3 MB/s MB/s (2.3x) - unordered_write: 645.6 MB/s (5.8x with relaxed snapshot guarantees) - WRITER_PREPARED with unordered_write disable concurrency control: 185.3 MB/s MB/s (2.35x) Limitations: - The feature is not yet extended to `max_successive_merges` > 0. The feature is also incompatible with `enable_pipelined_write` = true as well as with `allow_concurrent_memtable_write` = false. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5218 Differential Revision: D15219029 Pulled By: maysamyabandeh fbshipit-source-id: 38f2abc4af8780148c6128acdba2b3227bc81759
6 years ago
assert(!concurrent_memtable_writes_);
LookupKey lkey(key, sequence_);
// Count the number of successive merges at the head
// of the key in the memtable
size_t num_merges = mem->CountSuccessiveMergeEntries(lkey);
if (num_merges >= moptions->max_successive_merges) {
perform_merge = true;
}
}
if (perform_merge) {
// 1) Get the existing value
std::string get_value;
// Pass in the sequence number so that we also include previous merge
// operations in the same batch.
SnapshotImpl read_from_snapshot;
read_from_snapshot.number_ = sequence_;
ReadOptions read_options;
read_options.snapshot = &read_from_snapshot;
auto cf_handle = cf_mems_->GetColumnFamilyHandle();
if (cf_handle == nullptr) {
cf_handle = db_->DefaultColumnFamily();
}
Status get_status = db_->Get(read_options, cf_handle, key, &get_value);
if (!get_status.ok()) {
// Failed to read a key we know exists. Store the delta in memtable.
perform_merge = false;
} else {
Slice get_value_slice = Slice(get_value);
// 2) Apply this merge
auto merge_operator = moptions->merge_operator;
assert(merge_operator);
std::string new_value;
Status merge_status = MergeHelper::TimedFullMerge(
merge_operator, key, &get_value_slice, {value}, &new_value,
moptions->info_log, moptions->statistics,
SystemClock::Default().get());
if (!merge_status.ok()) {
// Failed to merge!
// Store the delta in memtable
perform_merge = false;
} else {
// 3) Add value to memtable
assert(!concurrent_memtable_writes_);
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
if (kv_prot_info != nullptr) {
auto merged_kv_prot_info =
kv_prot_info->StripC(column_family_id).ProtectS(sequence_);
merged_kv_prot_info.UpdateV(value, new_value);
merged_kv_prot_info.UpdateO(kTypeMerge, kTypeValue);
ret_status = mem->Add(sequence_, kTypeValue, key, new_value,
&merged_kv_prot_info);
} else {
ret_status = mem->Add(sequence_, kTypeValue, key, new_value,
nullptr /* kv_prot_info */);
}
}
}
}
if (!perform_merge) {
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
assert(ret_status.ok());
// Add merge operand to memtable
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
if (kv_prot_info != nullptr) {
auto mem_kv_prot_info =
kv_prot_info->StripC(column_family_id).ProtectS(sequence_);
ret_status =
mem->Add(sequence_, kTypeMerge, key, value, &mem_kv_prot_info,
concurrent_memtable_writes_, get_post_process_info(mem));
} else {
ret_status = mem->Add(
sequence_, kTypeMerge, key, value, nullptr /* kv_prot_info */,
concurrent_memtable_writes_, get_post_process_info(mem));
}
}
if (UNLIKELY(ret_status.IsTryAgain())) {
assert(seq_per_batch_);
const bool kBatchBoundary = true;
MaybeAdvanceSeq(kBatchBoundary);
} else if (ret_status.ok()) {
MaybeAdvanceSeq();
CheckMemtableFull();
}
// optimize for non-recovery mode
// If `ret_status` is `TryAgain` then the next (successful) try will add
// the key to the rebuilding transaction object. If `ret_status` is
// another non-OK `Status`, then the `rebuilding_trx_` will be thrown
// away. So we only need to add to it when `ret_status.ok()`.
if (UNLIKELY(ret_status.ok() && rebuilding_trx_ != nullptr)) {
assert(!write_after_commit_);
// TODO(ajkr): propagate `ProtectionInfoKVOS64`.
ret_status = WriteBatchInternal::Merge(rebuilding_trx_, column_family_id,
key, value);
}
return ret_status;
}
support for concurrent adds to memtable Summary: This diff adds support for concurrent adds to the skiplist memtable implementations. Memory allocation is made thread-safe by the addition of a spinlock, with small per-core buffers to avoid contention. Concurrent memtable writes are made via an additional method and don't impose a performance overhead on the non-concurrent case, so parallelism can be selected on a per-batch basis. Write thread synchronization is an increasing bottleneck for higher levels of concurrency, so this diff adds --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield (default off). This feature causes threads joining a write batch group to spin for a short time (default 100 usec) using sched_yield, rather than going to sleep on a mutex. If the timing of the yield calls indicates that another thread has actually run during the yield then spinning is avoided. This option improves performance for concurrent situations even without parallel adds, although it has the potential to increase CPU usage (and the heuristic adaptation is not yet mature). Parallel writes are not currently compatible with inplace updates, update callbacks, or delete filtering. Enable it with --allow_concurrent_memtable_write (and --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield). Parallel memtable writes are performance neutral when there is no actual parallelism, and in my experiments (SSD server-class Linux and varying contention and key sizes for fillrandom) they are always a performance win when there is more than one thread. Statistics are updated earlier in the write path, dropping the number of DB mutex acquisitions from 2 to 1 for almost all cases. This diff was motivated and inspired by Yahoo's cLSM work. It is more conservative than cLSM: RocksDB's write batch group leader role is preserved (along with all of the existing flush and write throttling logic) and concurrent writers are blocked until all memtable insertions have completed and the sequence number has been advanced, to preserve linearizability. My test config is "db_bench -benchmarks=fillrandom -threads=$T -batch_size=1 -memtablerep=skip_list -value_size=100 --num=1000000/$T -level0_slowdown_writes_trigger=9999 -level0_stop_writes_trigger=9999 -disable_auto_compactions --max_write_buffer_number=8 -max_background_flushes=8 --disable_wal --write_buffer_size=160000000 --block_size=16384 --allow_concurrent_memtable_write" on a two-socket Xeon E5-2660 @ 2.2Ghz with lots of memory and an SSD hard drive. With 1 thread I get ~440Kops/sec. Peak performance for 1 socket (numactl -N1) is slightly more than 1Mops/sec, at 16 threads. Peak performance across both sockets happens at 30 threads, and is ~900Kops/sec, although with fewer threads there is less performance loss when the system has background work. Test Plan: 1. concurrent stress tests for InlineSkipList and DynamicBloom 2. make clean; make check 3. make clean; DISABLE_JEMALLOC=1 make valgrind_check; valgrind db_bench 4. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_TSAN=1 make all check; db_bench 5. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_ASAN=1 make all check; db_bench 6. make clean; OPT=-DROCKSDB_LITE make check 7. verify no perf regressions when disabled Reviewers: igor, sdong Reviewed By: sdong Subscribers: MarkCallaghan, IslamAbdelRahman, anthony, yhchiang, rven, sdong, guyg8, kradhakrishnan, dhruba Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D50589
9 years ago
Status PutBlobIndexCF(uint32_t column_family_id, const Slice& key,
const Slice& value) override {
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
const auto* kv_prot_info = NextProtectionInfo();
if (kv_prot_info != nullptr) {
// Memtable needs seqno, doesn't need CF ID
auto mem_kv_prot_info =
kv_prot_info->StripC(column_family_id).ProtectS(sequence_);
// Same as PutCF except for value type.
return PutCFImpl(column_family_id, key, value, kTypeBlobIndex,
&mem_kv_prot_info);
} else {
return PutCFImpl(column_family_id, key, value, kTypeBlobIndex,
nullptr /* kv_prot_info */);
}
}
support for concurrent adds to memtable Summary: This diff adds support for concurrent adds to the skiplist memtable implementations. Memory allocation is made thread-safe by the addition of a spinlock, with small per-core buffers to avoid contention. Concurrent memtable writes are made via an additional method and don't impose a performance overhead on the non-concurrent case, so parallelism can be selected on a per-batch basis. Write thread synchronization is an increasing bottleneck for higher levels of concurrency, so this diff adds --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield (default off). This feature causes threads joining a write batch group to spin for a short time (default 100 usec) using sched_yield, rather than going to sleep on a mutex. If the timing of the yield calls indicates that another thread has actually run during the yield then spinning is avoided. This option improves performance for concurrent situations even without parallel adds, although it has the potential to increase CPU usage (and the heuristic adaptation is not yet mature). Parallel writes are not currently compatible with inplace updates, update callbacks, or delete filtering. Enable it with --allow_concurrent_memtable_write (and --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield). Parallel memtable writes are performance neutral when there is no actual parallelism, and in my experiments (SSD server-class Linux and varying contention and key sizes for fillrandom) they are always a performance win when there is more than one thread. Statistics are updated earlier in the write path, dropping the number of DB mutex acquisitions from 2 to 1 for almost all cases. This diff was motivated and inspired by Yahoo's cLSM work. It is more conservative than cLSM: RocksDB's write batch group leader role is preserved (along with all of the existing flush and write throttling logic) and concurrent writers are blocked until all memtable insertions have completed and the sequence number has been advanced, to preserve linearizability. My test config is "db_bench -benchmarks=fillrandom -threads=$T -batch_size=1 -memtablerep=skip_list -value_size=100 --num=1000000/$T -level0_slowdown_writes_trigger=9999 -level0_stop_writes_trigger=9999 -disable_auto_compactions --max_write_buffer_number=8 -max_background_flushes=8 --disable_wal --write_buffer_size=160000000 --block_size=16384 --allow_concurrent_memtable_write" on a two-socket Xeon E5-2660 @ 2.2Ghz with lots of memory and an SSD hard drive. With 1 thread I get ~440Kops/sec. Peak performance for 1 socket (numactl -N1) is slightly more than 1Mops/sec, at 16 threads. Peak performance across both sockets happens at 30 threads, and is ~900Kops/sec, although with fewer threads there is less performance loss when the system has background work. Test Plan: 1. concurrent stress tests for InlineSkipList and DynamicBloom 2. make clean; make check 3. make clean; DISABLE_JEMALLOC=1 make valgrind_check; valgrind db_bench 4. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_TSAN=1 make all check; db_bench 5. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_ASAN=1 make all check; db_bench 6. make clean; OPT=-DROCKSDB_LITE make check 7. verify no perf regressions when disabled Reviewers: igor, sdong Reviewed By: sdong Subscribers: MarkCallaghan, IslamAbdelRahman, anthony, yhchiang, rven, sdong, guyg8, kradhakrishnan, dhruba Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D50589
9 years ago
void CheckMemtableFull() {
if (flush_scheduler_ != nullptr) {
auto* cfd = cf_mems_->current();
assert(cfd != nullptr);
if (cfd->mem()->ShouldScheduleFlush() &&
cfd->mem()->MarkFlushScheduled()) {
// MarkFlushScheduled only returns true if we are the one that
// should take action, so no need to dedup further
Refactor trimming logic for immutable memtables (#5022) Summary: MyRocks currently sets `max_write_buffer_number_to_maintain` in order to maintain enough history for transaction conflict checking. The effectiveness of this approach depends on the size of memtables. When memtables are small, it may not keep enough history; when memtables are large, this may consume too much memory. We are proposing a new way to configure memtable list history: by limiting the memory usage of immutable memtables. The new option is `max_write_buffer_size_to_maintain` and it will take precedence over the old `max_write_buffer_number_to_maintain` if they are both set to non-zero values. The new option accounts for the total memory usage of flushed immutable memtables and mutable memtable. When the total usage exceeds the limit, RocksDB may start dropping immutable memtables (which is also called trimming history), starting from the oldest one. The semantics of the old option actually works both as an upper bound and lower bound. History trimming will start if number of immutable memtables exceeds the limit, but it will never go below (limit-1) due to history trimming. In order the mimic the behavior with the new option, history trimming will stop if dropping the next immutable memtable causes the total memory usage go below the size limit. For example, assuming the size limit is set to 64MB, and there are 3 immutable memtables with sizes of 20, 30, 30. Although the total memory usage is 80MB > 64MB, dropping the oldest memtable will reduce the memory usage to 60MB < 64MB, so in this case no memtable will be dropped. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5022 Differential Revision: D14394062 Pulled By: miasantreble fbshipit-source-id: 60457a509c6af89d0993f988c9b5c2aa9e45f5c5
5 years ago
flush_scheduler_->ScheduleWork(cfd);
}
}
// check if memtable_list size exceeds max_write_buffer_size_to_maintain
if (trim_history_scheduler_ != nullptr) {
auto* cfd = cf_mems_->current();
assert(cfd);
assert(cfd->ioptions());
const size_t size_to_maintain = static_cast<size_t>(
cfd->ioptions()->max_write_buffer_size_to_maintain);
if (size_to_maintain > 0) {
MemTableList* const imm = cfd->imm();
assert(imm);
if (imm->HasHistory()) {
const MemTable* const mem = cfd->mem();
assert(mem);
if (mem->ApproximateMemoryUsageFast() +
imm->ApproximateMemoryUsageExcludingLast() >=
size_to_maintain &&
imm->MarkTrimHistoryNeeded()) {
trim_history_scheduler_->ScheduleWork(cfd);
}
}
support for concurrent adds to memtable Summary: This diff adds support for concurrent adds to the skiplist memtable implementations. Memory allocation is made thread-safe by the addition of a spinlock, with small per-core buffers to avoid contention. Concurrent memtable writes are made via an additional method and don't impose a performance overhead on the non-concurrent case, so parallelism can be selected on a per-batch basis. Write thread synchronization is an increasing bottleneck for higher levels of concurrency, so this diff adds --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield (default off). This feature causes threads joining a write batch group to spin for a short time (default 100 usec) using sched_yield, rather than going to sleep on a mutex. If the timing of the yield calls indicates that another thread has actually run during the yield then spinning is avoided. This option improves performance for concurrent situations even without parallel adds, although it has the potential to increase CPU usage (and the heuristic adaptation is not yet mature). Parallel writes are not currently compatible with inplace updates, update callbacks, or delete filtering. Enable it with --allow_concurrent_memtable_write (and --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield). Parallel memtable writes are performance neutral when there is no actual parallelism, and in my experiments (SSD server-class Linux and varying contention and key sizes for fillrandom) they are always a performance win when there is more than one thread. Statistics are updated earlier in the write path, dropping the number of DB mutex acquisitions from 2 to 1 for almost all cases. This diff was motivated and inspired by Yahoo's cLSM work. It is more conservative than cLSM: RocksDB's write batch group leader role is preserved (along with all of the existing flush and write throttling logic) and concurrent writers are blocked until all memtable insertions have completed and the sequence number has been advanced, to preserve linearizability. My test config is "db_bench -benchmarks=fillrandom -threads=$T -batch_size=1 -memtablerep=skip_list -value_size=100 --num=1000000/$T -level0_slowdown_writes_trigger=9999 -level0_stop_writes_trigger=9999 -disable_auto_compactions --max_write_buffer_number=8 -max_background_flushes=8 --disable_wal --write_buffer_size=160000000 --block_size=16384 --allow_concurrent_memtable_write" on a two-socket Xeon E5-2660 @ 2.2Ghz with lots of memory and an SSD hard drive. With 1 thread I get ~440Kops/sec. Peak performance for 1 socket (numactl -N1) is slightly more than 1Mops/sec, at 16 threads. Peak performance across both sockets happens at 30 threads, and is ~900Kops/sec, although with fewer threads there is less performance loss when the system has background work. Test Plan: 1. concurrent stress tests for InlineSkipList and DynamicBloom 2. make clean; make check 3. make clean; DISABLE_JEMALLOC=1 make valgrind_check; valgrind db_bench 4. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_TSAN=1 make all check; db_bench 5. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_ASAN=1 make all check; db_bench 6. make clean; OPT=-DROCKSDB_LITE make check 7. verify no perf regressions when disabled Reviewers: igor, sdong Reviewed By: sdong Subscribers: MarkCallaghan, IslamAbdelRahman, anthony, yhchiang, rven, sdong, guyg8, kradhakrishnan, dhruba Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D50589
9 years ago
}
}
}
// The write batch handler calls MarkBeginPrepare with unprepare set to true
// if it encounters the kTypeBeginUnprepareXID marker.
Status MarkBeginPrepare(bool unprepare) override {
assert(rebuilding_trx_ == nullptr);
assert(db_);
if (recovering_log_number_ != 0) {
// during recovery we rebuild a hollow transaction
// from all encountered prepare sections of the wal
if (db_->allow_2pc() == false) {
return Status::NotSupported(
"WAL contains prepared transactions. Open with "
"TransactionDB::Open().");
}
// we are now iterating through a prepared section
rebuilding_trx_ = new WriteBatch();
rebuilding_trx_seq_ = sequence_;
// Verify that we have matching MarkBeginPrepare/MarkEndPrepare markers.
// unprepared_batch_ should be false because it is false by default, and
// gets reset to false in MarkEndPrepare.
assert(!unprepared_batch_);
unprepared_batch_ = unprepare;
if (has_valid_writes_ != nullptr) {
*has_valid_writes_ = true;
}
}
return Status::OK();
}
Status MarkEndPrepare(const Slice& name) override {
assert(db_);
assert((rebuilding_trx_ != nullptr) == (recovering_log_number_ != 0));
if (recovering_log_number_ != 0) {
assert(db_->allow_2pc());
size_t batch_cnt =
write_after_commit_
? 0 // 0 will disable further checks
: static_cast<size_t>(sequence_ - rebuilding_trx_seq_ + 1);
db_->InsertRecoveredTransaction(recovering_log_number_, name.ToString(),
rebuilding_trx_, rebuilding_trx_seq_,
batch_cnt, unprepared_batch_);
unprepared_batch_ = false;
rebuilding_trx_ = nullptr;
} else {
assert(rebuilding_trx_ == nullptr);
}
const bool batch_boundry = true;
MaybeAdvanceSeq(batch_boundry);
return Status::OK();
}
Status MarkNoop(bool empty_batch) override {
// A hack in pessimistic transaction could result into a noop at the start
// of the write batch, that should be ignored.
if (!empty_batch) {
// In the absence of Prepare markers, a kTypeNoop tag indicates the end of
// a batch. This happens when write batch commits skipping the prepare
// phase.
const bool batch_boundry = true;
MaybeAdvanceSeq(batch_boundry);
}
return Status::OK();
}
Status MarkCommit(const Slice& name) override {
assert(db_);
Status s;
if (recovering_log_number_ != 0) {
// in recovery when we encounter a commit marker
// we lookup this transaction in our set of rebuilt transactions
// and commit.
auto trx = db_->GetRecoveredTransaction(name.ToString());
// the log containing the prepared section may have
// been released in the last incarnation because the
// data was flushed to L0
if (trx != nullptr) {
// at this point individual CF lognumbers will prevent
// duplicate re-insertion of values.
assert(log_number_ref_ == 0);
if (write_after_commit_) {
// write_after_commit_ can only have one batch in trx.
assert(trx->batches_.size() == 1);
const auto& batch_info = trx->batches_.begin()->second;
// all inserts must reference this trx log number
log_number_ref_ = batch_info.log_number_;
s = batch_info.batch_->Iterate(this);
log_number_ref_ = 0;
}
// else the values are already inserted before the commit
if (s.ok()) {
db_->DeleteRecoveredTransaction(name.ToString());
}
if (has_valid_writes_ != nullptr) {
*has_valid_writes_ = true;
}
}
} else {
// When writes are not delayed until commit, there is no disconnect
// between a memtable write and the WAL that supports it. So the commit
// need not reference any log as the only log to which it depends.
assert(!write_after_commit_ || log_number_ref_ > 0);
}
const bool batch_boundry = true;
MaybeAdvanceSeq(batch_boundry);
return s;
}
Status MarkRollback(const Slice& name) override {
assert(db_);
if (recovering_log_number_ != 0) {
auto trx = db_->GetRecoveredTransaction(name.ToString());
// the log containing the transactions prep section
// may have been released in the previous incarnation
// because we knew it had been rolled back
if (trx != nullptr) {
db_->DeleteRecoveredTransaction(name.ToString());
}
} else {
// in non recovery we simply ignore this tag
}
const bool batch_boundry = true;
MaybeAdvanceSeq(batch_boundry);
return Status::OK();
}
private:
MemTablePostProcessInfo* get_post_process_info(MemTable* mem) {
if (!concurrent_memtable_writes_) {
// No need to batch counters locally if we don't use concurrent mode.
return nullptr;
}
return &GetPostMap()[mem];
}
};
// This function can only be called in these conditions:
// 1) During Recovery()
// 2) During Write(), in a single-threaded write thread
support for concurrent adds to memtable Summary: This diff adds support for concurrent adds to the skiplist memtable implementations. Memory allocation is made thread-safe by the addition of a spinlock, with small per-core buffers to avoid contention. Concurrent memtable writes are made via an additional method and don't impose a performance overhead on the non-concurrent case, so parallelism can be selected on a per-batch basis. Write thread synchronization is an increasing bottleneck for higher levels of concurrency, so this diff adds --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield (default off). This feature causes threads joining a write batch group to spin for a short time (default 100 usec) using sched_yield, rather than going to sleep on a mutex. If the timing of the yield calls indicates that another thread has actually run during the yield then spinning is avoided. This option improves performance for concurrent situations even without parallel adds, although it has the potential to increase CPU usage (and the heuristic adaptation is not yet mature). Parallel writes are not currently compatible with inplace updates, update callbacks, or delete filtering. Enable it with --allow_concurrent_memtable_write (and --enable_write_thread_adaptive_yield). Parallel memtable writes are performance neutral when there is no actual parallelism, and in my experiments (SSD server-class Linux and varying contention and key sizes for fillrandom) they are always a performance win when there is more than one thread. Statistics are updated earlier in the write path, dropping the number of DB mutex acquisitions from 2 to 1 for almost all cases. This diff was motivated and inspired by Yahoo's cLSM work. It is more conservative than cLSM: RocksDB's write batch group leader role is preserved (along with all of the existing flush and write throttling logic) and concurrent writers are blocked until all memtable insertions have completed and the sequence number has been advanced, to preserve linearizability. My test config is "db_bench -benchmarks=fillrandom -threads=$T -batch_size=1 -memtablerep=skip_list -value_size=100 --num=1000000/$T -level0_slowdown_writes_trigger=9999 -level0_stop_writes_trigger=9999 -disable_auto_compactions --max_write_buffer_number=8 -max_background_flushes=8 --disable_wal --write_buffer_size=160000000 --block_size=16384 --allow_concurrent_memtable_write" on a two-socket Xeon E5-2660 @ 2.2Ghz with lots of memory and an SSD hard drive. With 1 thread I get ~440Kops/sec. Peak performance for 1 socket (numactl -N1) is slightly more than 1Mops/sec, at 16 threads. Peak performance across both sockets happens at 30 threads, and is ~900Kops/sec, although with fewer threads there is less performance loss when the system has background work. Test Plan: 1. concurrent stress tests for InlineSkipList and DynamicBloom 2. make clean; make check 3. make clean; DISABLE_JEMALLOC=1 make valgrind_check; valgrind db_bench 4. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_TSAN=1 make all check; db_bench 5. make clean; COMPILE_WITH_ASAN=1 make all check; db_bench 6. make clean; OPT=-DROCKSDB_LITE make check 7. verify no perf regressions when disabled Reviewers: igor, sdong Reviewed By: sdong Subscribers: MarkCallaghan, IslamAbdelRahman, anthony, yhchiang, rven, sdong, guyg8, kradhakrishnan, dhruba Differential Revision: https://reviews.facebook.net/D50589
9 years ago
// 3) During Write(), in a concurrent context where memtables has been cloned
// The reason is that it calls memtables->Seek(), which has a stateful cache
Status WriteBatchInternal::InsertInto(
WriteThread::WriteGroup& write_group, SequenceNumber sequence,
ColumnFamilyMemTables* memtables, FlushScheduler* flush_scheduler,
Refactor trimming logic for immutable memtables (#5022) Summary: MyRocks currently sets `max_write_buffer_number_to_maintain` in order to maintain enough history for transaction conflict checking. The effectiveness of this approach depends on the size of memtables. When memtables are small, it may not keep enough history; when memtables are large, this may consume too much memory. We are proposing a new way to configure memtable list history: by limiting the memory usage of immutable memtables. The new option is `max_write_buffer_size_to_maintain` and it will take precedence over the old `max_write_buffer_number_to_maintain` if they are both set to non-zero values. The new option accounts for the total memory usage of flushed immutable memtables and mutable memtable. When the total usage exceeds the limit, RocksDB may start dropping immutable memtables (which is also called trimming history), starting from the oldest one. The semantics of the old option actually works both as an upper bound and lower bound. History trimming will start if number of immutable memtables exceeds the limit, but it will never go below (limit-1) due to history trimming. In order the mimic the behavior with the new option, history trimming will stop if dropping the next immutable memtable causes the total memory usage go below the size limit. For example, assuming the size limit is set to 64MB, and there are 3 immutable memtables with sizes of 20, 30, 30. Although the total memory usage is 80MB > 64MB, dropping the oldest memtable will reduce the memory usage to 60MB < 64MB, so in this case no memtable will be dropped. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5022 Differential Revision: D14394062 Pulled By: miasantreble fbshipit-source-id: 60457a509c6af89d0993f988c9b5c2aa9e45f5c5
5 years ago
TrimHistoryScheduler* trim_history_scheduler,
bool ignore_missing_column_families, uint64_t recovery_log_number, DB* db,
bool concurrent_memtable_writes, bool seq_per_batch, bool batch_per_txn) {
MemTableInserter inserter(
Refactor trimming logic for immutable memtables (#5022) Summary: MyRocks currently sets `max_write_buffer_number_to_maintain` in order to maintain enough history for transaction conflict checking. The effectiveness of this approach depends on the size of memtables. When memtables are small, it may not keep enough history; when memtables are large, this may consume too much memory. We are proposing a new way to configure memtable list history: by limiting the memory usage of immutable memtables. The new option is `max_write_buffer_size_to_maintain` and it will take precedence over the old `max_write_buffer_number_to_maintain` if they are both set to non-zero values. The new option accounts for the total memory usage of flushed immutable memtables and mutable memtable. When the total usage exceeds the limit, RocksDB may start dropping immutable memtables (which is also called trimming history), starting from the oldest one. The semantics of the old option actually works both as an upper bound and lower bound. History trimming will start if number of immutable memtables exceeds the limit, but it will never go below (limit-1) due to history trimming. In order the mimic the behavior with the new option, history trimming will stop if dropping the next immutable memtable causes the total memory usage go below the size limit. For example, assuming the size limit is set to 64MB, and there are 3 immutable memtables with sizes of 20, 30, 30. Although the total memory usage is 80MB > 64MB, dropping the oldest memtable will reduce the memory usage to 60MB < 64MB, so in this case no memtable will be dropped. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5022 Differential Revision: D14394062 Pulled By: miasantreble fbshipit-source-id: 60457a509c6af89d0993f988c9b5c2aa9e45f5c5
5 years ago
sequence, memtables, flush_scheduler, trim_history_scheduler,
ignore_missing_column_families, recovery_log_number, db,
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
concurrent_memtable_writes, nullptr /* prot_info */,
nullptr /*has_valid_writes*/, seq_per_batch, batch_per_txn);
for (auto w : write_group) {
if (w->CallbackFailed()) {
continue;
}
w->sequence = inserter.sequence();
if (!w->ShouldWriteToMemtable()) {
// In seq_per_batch_ mode this advances the seq by one.
inserter.MaybeAdvanceSeq(true);
continue;
}
SetSequence(w->batch, inserter.sequence());
inserter.set_log_number_ref(w->log_ref);
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
inserter.set_prot_info(w->batch->prot_info_.get());
w->status = w->batch->Iterate(&inserter);
if (!w->status.ok()) {
return w->status;
}
assert(!seq_per_batch || w->batch_cnt != 0);
assert(!seq_per_batch || inserter.sequence() - w->sequence == w->batch_cnt);
}
return Status::OK();
}
Status WriteBatchInternal::InsertInto(
WriteThread::Writer* writer, SequenceNumber sequence,
ColumnFamilyMemTables* memtables, FlushScheduler* flush_scheduler,
Refactor trimming logic for immutable memtables (#5022) Summary: MyRocks currently sets `max_write_buffer_number_to_maintain` in order to maintain enough history for transaction conflict checking. The effectiveness of this approach depends on the size of memtables. When memtables are small, it may not keep enough history; when memtables are large, this may consume too much memory. We are proposing a new way to configure memtable list history: by limiting the memory usage of immutable memtables. The new option is `max_write_buffer_size_to_maintain` and it will take precedence over the old `max_write_buffer_number_to_maintain` if they are both set to non-zero values. The new option accounts for the total memory usage of flushed immutable memtables and mutable memtable. When the total usage exceeds the limit, RocksDB may start dropping immutable memtables (which is also called trimming history), starting from the oldest one. The semantics of the old option actually works both as an upper bound and lower bound. History trimming will start if number of immutable memtables exceeds the limit, but it will never go below (limit-1) due to history trimming. In order the mimic the behavior with the new option, history trimming will stop if dropping the next immutable memtable causes the total memory usage go below the size limit. For example, assuming the size limit is set to 64MB, and there are 3 immutable memtables with sizes of 20, 30, 30. Although the total memory usage is 80MB > 64MB, dropping the oldest memtable will reduce the memory usage to 60MB < 64MB, so in this case no memtable will be dropped. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5022 Differential Revision: D14394062 Pulled By: miasantreble fbshipit-source-id: 60457a509c6af89d0993f988c9b5c2aa9e45f5c5
5 years ago
TrimHistoryScheduler* trim_history_scheduler,
bool ignore_missing_column_families, uint64_t log_number, DB* db,
bool concurrent_memtable_writes, bool seq_per_batch, size_t batch_cnt,
bool batch_per_txn, bool hint_per_batch) {
#ifdef NDEBUG
(void)batch_cnt;
#endif
assert(writer->ShouldWriteToMemtable());
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
MemTableInserter inserter(sequence, memtables, flush_scheduler,
trim_history_scheduler,
ignore_missing_column_families, log_number, db,
concurrent_memtable_writes, nullptr /* prot_info */,
nullptr /*has_valid_writes*/, seq_per_batch,
batch_per_txn, hint_per_batch);
SetSequence(writer->batch, sequence);
inserter.set_log_number_ref(writer->log_ref);
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
inserter.set_prot_info(writer->batch->prot_info_.get());
Status s = writer->batch->Iterate(&inserter);
assert(!seq_per_batch || batch_cnt != 0);
assert(!seq_per_batch || inserter.sequence() - sequence == batch_cnt);
if (concurrent_memtable_writes) {
inserter.PostProcess();
}
return s;
}
Status WriteBatchInternal::InsertInto(
const WriteBatch* batch, ColumnFamilyMemTables* memtables,
Refactor trimming logic for immutable memtables (#5022) Summary: MyRocks currently sets `max_write_buffer_number_to_maintain` in order to maintain enough history for transaction conflict checking. The effectiveness of this approach depends on the size of memtables. When memtables are small, it may not keep enough history; when memtables are large, this may consume too much memory. We are proposing a new way to configure memtable list history: by limiting the memory usage of immutable memtables. The new option is `max_write_buffer_size_to_maintain` and it will take precedence over the old `max_write_buffer_number_to_maintain` if they are both set to non-zero values. The new option accounts for the total memory usage of flushed immutable memtables and mutable memtable. When the total usage exceeds the limit, RocksDB may start dropping immutable memtables (which is also called trimming history), starting from the oldest one. The semantics of the old option actually works both as an upper bound and lower bound. History trimming will start if number of immutable memtables exceeds the limit, but it will never go below (limit-1) due to history trimming. In order the mimic the behavior with the new option, history trimming will stop if dropping the next immutable memtable causes the total memory usage go below the size limit. For example, assuming the size limit is set to 64MB, and there are 3 immutable memtables with sizes of 20, 30, 30. Although the total memory usage is 80MB > 64MB, dropping the oldest memtable will reduce the memory usage to 60MB < 64MB, so in this case no memtable will be dropped. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5022 Differential Revision: D14394062 Pulled By: miasantreble fbshipit-source-id: 60457a509c6af89d0993f988c9b5c2aa9e45f5c5
5 years ago
FlushScheduler* flush_scheduler,
TrimHistoryScheduler* trim_history_scheduler,
bool ignore_missing_column_families, uint64_t log_number, DB* db,
bool concurrent_memtable_writes, SequenceNumber* next_seq,
bool* has_valid_writes, bool seq_per_batch, bool batch_per_txn) {
MemTableInserter inserter(Sequence(batch), memtables, flush_scheduler,
Refactor trimming logic for immutable memtables (#5022) Summary: MyRocks currently sets `max_write_buffer_number_to_maintain` in order to maintain enough history for transaction conflict checking. The effectiveness of this approach depends on the size of memtables. When memtables are small, it may not keep enough history; when memtables are large, this may consume too much memory. We are proposing a new way to configure memtable list history: by limiting the memory usage of immutable memtables. The new option is `max_write_buffer_size_to_maintain` and it will take precedence over the old `max_write_buffer_number_to_maintain` if they are both set to non-zero values. The new option accounts for the total memory usage of flushed immutable memtables and mutable memtable. When the total usage exceeds the limit, RocksDB may start dropping immutable memtables (which is also called trimming history), starting from the oldest one. The semantics of the old option actually works both as an upper bound and lower bound. History trimming will start if number of immutable memtables exceeds the limit, but it will never go below (limit-1) due to history trimming. In order the mimic the behavior with the new option, history trimming will stop if dropping the next immutable memtable causes the total memory usage go below the size limit. For example, assuming the size limit is set to 64MB, and there are 3 immutable memtables with sizes of 20, 30, 30. Although the total memory usage is 80MB > 64MB, dropping the oldest memtable will reduce the memory usage to 60MB < 64MB, so in this case no memtable will be dropped. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/5022 Differential Revision: D14394062 Pulled By: miasantreble fbshipit-source-id: 60457a509c6af89d0993f988c9b5c2aa9e45f5c5
5 years ago
trim_history_scheduler,
ignore_missing_column_families, log_number, db,
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
concurrent_memtable_writes, batch->prot_info_.get(),
has_valid_writes, seq_per_batch, batch_per_txn);
Status s = batch->Iterate(&inserter);
if (next_seq != nullptr) {
*next_seq = inserter.sequence();
}
if (concurrent_memtable_writes) {
inserter.PostProcess();
}
return s;
}
Status WriteBatchInternal::SetContents(WriteBatch* b, const Slice& contents) {
assert(contents.size() >= WriteBatchInternal::kHeader);
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
assert(b->prot_info_ == nullptr);
b->rep_.assign(contents.data(), contents.size());
b->content_flags_.store(ContentFlags::DEFERRED, std::memory_order_relaxed);
return Status::OK();
}
Status WriteBatchInternal::Append(WriteBatch* dst, const WriteBatch* src,
const bool wal_only) {
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
assert(dst->Count() == 0 ||
(dst->prot_info_ == nullptr) == (src->prot_info_ == nullptr));
size_t src_len;
int src_count;
uint32_t src_flags;
const SavePoint& batch_end = src->GetWalTerminationPoint();
if (wal_only && !batch_end.is_cleared()) {
src_len = batch_end.size - WriteBatchInternal::kHeader;
src_count = batch_end.count;
src_flags = batch_end.content_flags;
} else {
src_len = src->rep_.size() - WriteBatchInternal::kHeader;
src_count = Count(src);
src_flags = src->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed);
}
Integrity protection for live updates to WriteBatch (#7748) Summary: This PR adds the foundation classes for key-value integrity protection and the first use case: protecting live updates from the source buffers added to `WriteBatch` through the destination buffer in `MemTable`. The width of the protection info is not yet configurable -- only eight bytes per key is supported. This PR allows users to enable protection by constructing `WriteBatch` with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`. It does not yet expose a way for users to get integrity protection via other write APIs (e.g., `Put()`, `Merge()`, `Delete()`, etc.). The foundation classes (`ProtectionInfo.*`) embed the coverage info in their type, and provide `Protect.*()` and `Strip.*()` functions to navigate between types with different coverage. For making bytes per key configurable (for powers of two up to eight) in the future, these classes are templated on the unsigned integer type used to store the protection info. That integer contains the XOR'd result of hashes with independent seeds for all covered fields. For integer fields, the hash is computed on the raw unadjusted bytes, so the result is endian-dependent. The most significant bytes are truncated when the hash value (8 bytes) is wider than the protection integer. When `WriteBatch` is constructed with `protection_bytes_per_key == 8`, we hold a `ProtectionInfoKVOTC` (i.e., one that covers key, value, optype aka `ValueType`, timestamp, and CF ID) for each entry added to the batch. The protection info is generated from the original buffers passed by the user, as well as the original metadata generated internally. When writing to memtable, each entry is transformed to a `ProtectionInfoKVOTS` (i.e., dropping coverage of CF ID and adding coverage of sequence number), since at that point we know the sequence number, and have already selected a memtable corresponding to a particular CF. This protection info is verified once the entry is encoded in the `MemTable` buffer. Pull Request resolved: https://github.com/facebook/rocksdb/pull/7748 Test Plan: - an integration test to verify a wide variety of single-byte changes to the encoded `MemTable` buffer are caught - add to stress/crash test to verify it works in variety of configs/operations without intentional corruption - [deferred] unit tests for `ProtectionInfo.*` classes for edge cases like KV swap, `SliceParts` and `Slice` APIs are interchangeable, etc. Reviewed By: pdillinger Differential Revision: D25754492 Pulled By: ajkr fbshipit-source-id: e481bac6c03c2ab268be41359730f1ceb9964866
4 years ago
if (dst->prot_info_ != nullptr) {
std::copy(src->prot_info_->entries_.begin(),
src->prot_info_->entries_.begin() + src_count,
std::back_inserter(dst->prot_info_->entries_));
} else if (src->prot_info_ != nullptr) {
dst->prot_info_.reset(new WriteBatch::ProtectionInfo(*src->prot_info_));
}
SetCount(dst, Count(dst) + src_count);
assert(src->rep_.size() >= WriteBatchInternal::kHeader);
dst->rep_.append(src->rep_.data() + WriteBatchInternal::kHeader, src_len);
dst->content_flags_.store(
dst->content_flags_.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) | src_flags,
std::memory_order_relaxed);
return Status::OK();
}
size_t WriteBatchInternal::AppendedByteSize(size_t leftByteSize,
size_t rightByteSize) {
if (leftByteSize == 0 || rightByteSize == 0) {
return leftByteSize + rightByteSize;
} else {
return leftByteSize + rightByteSize - WriteBatchInternal::kHeader;
}
}
} // namespace ROCKSDB_NAMESPACE